Oklahoma Law Review
Volume 74

Number 3

2022

Against Corporate Activism: Examining the Use of Corporate
Speech to Promote Corporate Social Responsibility
W.C. Bunting

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
W.C. Bunting, Against Corporate Activism: Examining the Use of Corporate Speech to Promote Corporate
Social Responsibility, 74 OKLA. L. REV. 245 (2022),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Law-LibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

AGAINST CORPORATE ACTIVISM: EXAMINING
THE USE OF CORPORATE SPEECH TO PROMOTE
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
W.C. BUNTING*
Abstract
This Article offers a novel typography of expenditures on corporate
social responsibility, highlighting that such spending often requires a
public business corporation to engage in corporate speech. When this
speech pertains to social or political issues unrelated to the company’s
business, this Article argues that such expenditures are generally not in the
best interests of the firm’s stockholders and terms this spending “corporate
activism.” Corporate activism is described as the product of agency costs
and ideological conflict that derive from an expansion of corporate speech
rights under the First Amendment. To protect shareholders from corporate
activism, courts have relied upon various disciplining mechanisms that are
often not up to the task. This Article offers a different solution, placing the
responsibility squarely upon the board of directors of public corporations
to limit “expressive” expenditures on corporate social responsibility that
do not directly advance the best interests of a company’s shareholders. As a
tentative policy proposal, this Article suggests that the Securities and
Exchange Commission encourage public companies that trade on U.S.
stock exchanges to have a “Communications Committee” responsible for
the oversight of all forms of corporate speech.
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I. Introduction
In business ethics, a distinction is often drawn between corporate
expenditures on corporate social responsibility that are in the best interests
of a company’s stakeholders and expenditures that are not. Indeed, a rich
empirical literature investigates the causal relationship between corporate
social responsibility and various measures of financial performance. 1 What
has often been overlooked in this literature is a related distinction between
expenditures on corporate social responsibility that require a company to
engage in some form of protected speech and expenditures that do not. This
Article observes that many forms of corporate social responsibility require a
public business corporation to “speak,” be it directly or indirectly. A public
business corporation may speak directly through marketing activities, or the
corporation may speak indirectly through corporate contributions to
philanthropic organizations, including political action committees, in which
1. See infra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
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a firm promotes social or political issues often unrelated to the company’s
business. Corporate speech, however, raises several difficult conceptual
problems, many of which are familiar in the context of corporate political
speech, as famously discussed in the U.S. Supreme Court case Citizens
United v. FEC.2 Hence, while spending on corporate social responsibility
can benefit a broad set of corporate stakeholders, when this spending takes
the form of corporate speech on issues unrelated to the company’s business
(i.e., “corporate activism”), such expenditures are generally not in the best
interests of a firm’s stockholders. 3
In the following discussion, it will be useful to have a hypothetical in
mind. Consider a firm that manufactures toothpaste. Two production
processes are available to the firm: (1) a low-cost technology and (2) a
high-cost technology. The low-cost production technology is cheaper than
the high-cost technology but results in significant pollution of a nearby
river serving as the town’s main water supply. By contrast, the high-cost
technology, while more expensive, eliminates any pollution of the nearby
river. No laws or regulations currently prevent the use of the low-cost
technology. Suppose further that the social cost of pollution exceeds the
cost differential between the two production technologies; therefore, it is
socially optimal for the firm—albeit not in its financial best interest—to
choose the high-cost production technology.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II offers a novel typography of
expenditures on corporate social responsibility. This typography highlights
that corporate social responsibility often requires a public corporation to
engage in corporate speech, drawing a distinction between expenditures on
corporate social responsibility that are “expressive” and “inexpressive.”
Expressive expenditures are defined as corporate expenditures in which the
company engages in some form of protected speech. In general, expressive
expenditures on corporate social responsibility take two forms: (1)
marketing activities or (2) corporate contributions. This spending on
corporate speech is further categorized according to whether the
expenditure maximizes corporate profits. As others have argued, this
Article contends that expenditures on corporate social responsibility—made
2. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3. Whether the cost to corporate stockholders exceeds the benefit to other corporate
stakeholders, including a firm’s customers or employees, is a larger empirical question
outside the scope of this Article and left open for future research. For an argument that
corporate law can serve as a force for positive social change, see generally Jennifer S. Fan,
Woke Capital: The Role of Corporations in Social Movements, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 441
(2019).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

248

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:245

possible by the U.S. Supreme Court’s gradual expansion of corporate
speech rights—can lead to an important agency cost problem in which
managers make expenditures on corporate social responsibility that do not
maximize shareholder value, and which are motivated by interests other
than the firm’s shareholders.
Recognizing the agency costs implicated by expressive expenditures on
corporate social responsibility, especially in the context of corporate
political speech, the U.S. Supreme Court has relied upon specific
disciplining mechanisms to curb managerial discretion in justifying its
expansion of corporate speech rights over time. Part III examines three
main categories of disciplining mechanisms: (1) free market forces, (2)
mandated disclosures, and (3) corporate democracy. As others have
similarly argued, these mechanisms are largely unsatisfactory in many
cases.
Part IV provides an overview of the law of corporate advocacy, defined
as a combination of marketing activities and corporate contributions to
issue advocacy groups. Part IV also provides a brief survey of commercial
speech and discusses the case First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,4 in
which the U.S. Supreme Court held that corporations have First
Amendment speech protections that extend beyond commercial speech and
are free to express opinions on social or political issues unrelated to the
company’s business.5 This Article contends that the corporate advocacy
made possible by Bellotti is often not in the best interests of the company’s
shareholders and refers to such expenditures on corporate social
responsibility as “corporate activism.” Two distinct theoretical justifications
are provided for why spending on corporate advocacy is unlikely to
maximize shareholder value: (1) agency costs and (2) free speech as pure
conflict. This Article argues that public business corporations, and by
default their shareholders, benefit from less corporate speech rights by
avoiding a costly social conflict that does not advance the shareholders’
economic interests. As a corollary, this Article further makes the point that
an unfavorable view of the Citizens United decision—in which the Court
held that corporate speech rights include (with certain limitations)
communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate—is, in many ways, inconsistent with a favorable view

4. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
5. See id. at 784.
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of corporate advocacy (or “woke capitalism” as it is sometimes termed in
this context).6
To reduce the frequency with which public business corporations engage
in corporate activism, Part IV suggests, as a public policy proposal, that the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) encourage public companies
that trade on U.S. stock exchanges to have a “communications committee.”
The communications committee, chartered by the company’s board of
directors, would be responsible for the oversight of all forms of corporate
speech. The primary responsibility of this proposed communications
committee would be to ensure that spending on corporate speech promotes
the best interests of the corporation’s shareholders and not the interests of
other corporate stakeholders, including management or certain specialinterest groups with outsized influence.
Part V briefly concludes.
II. Typography of Corporate Social Responsibility
Part II presents a novel typography of expenditures on corporate social
responsibility, as set forth in Table 1.7
Table 1. Typography of Corporate Social Responsibility
Inexpressive Expenditures

Expressive Expenditures

Business Practices

Marketing

Contributions

Profit
Sacrificing

Stakeholder Primacy

Advocacy
Marketing

Philanthropic
Contributions

Profit
Maximizing

Environmental, Social, and
Governance Criteria
(“ESG Criteria”)

Cause
Marketing

Cause-Related
Contributions

6. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Com., 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
7. Table 1 accommodates a well-known typography of corporate social responsibility
that breaks down such activities into six distinct types of corporate social initiatives. See
generally PHILIP KOTLER & NANCY LEE, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY : DOING THE
MOST GOOD FOR YOUR COMPANY AND YOUR CAUSE (2005) (segmenting corporate social
responsibility activities into six types of corporate social initiatives: (1) corporate giving, (2)
community volunteering, (3) socially responsible business practices, (4) cause promotions,
(5) cause-related marketing, and (6) corporate social marketing).
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Note that Table 1 categorizes expenditures on corporate social
responsibility along two distinct dimensions: (1) whether the expenditure
maximizes shareholder profits and (2) whether the expenditure can be
defined as inexpressive or expressive.
A. Profit Maximization
As an initial matter, Table 1 assumes shareholder primacy, defined as a
normative model of corporate governance in which a manager has the
singular goal of maximizing shareholder value. 8 Although this Article
sometimes refers to the more general concept of shareholder value, the
market price of shares can be presumed the only—or at least the principal—
measure of the interests of a firm’s shareholders. 9 Accordingly, the question
of whether shareholders benefit from a given business decision can be
equated with the expected impact of that decision on a firm’s share price. In
addition, the market price of shares can be set equal to the sum of all
corporate profits discounted back to their present value. 10 Under this
discounted profit model of a firm’s stock price, the maximization of
corporate profits, as a measure of shareholder value, can thus be posited as
the only—or at least the primary—objective function of a corporate
manager.11

8. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 2–3 (1932) (stating that shareholders are a
corporation’s true owners); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 112 (1982)
(“[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it . . . engages in open and free
competition, without deception or fraud.”). See also Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970 (§
SM), at 17 (stating that a manager’s primary responsibility is to shareholders).
9. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001).
10. See generally Stephen H. Penman & Theodore Sougiannis, A Comparison of
Dividend, Cash Flow, and Earnings Approaches to Equity Valuation, 15 CONTEMP. ACCT.
RSCH. 343 (1998) (assuming that the market price of shares is efficient, i.e., equal to intrinsic
value).
11. Pure profit maximization may be too strong. As a more plausible alternative,
scholars have described an “enlightened value maximization” in which managers “[s]pend
an additional dollar on any constituency provided the long-term value added to the firm from
such expenditure is a dollar or more.” Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder
Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Oct. 29, 2001, at 14,
16.
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1. Stakeholder Primacy
This shareholder primacy model of corporate governance is often
contrasted with the stakeholder primacy model in which a manager is
obligated to serve the interests of a broader set of corporate stakeholders. 12
In addition to the company’s stockholders, other corporate stakeholders
include employees, creditors, customers, and local communities. 13 Under
the stakeholder primacy model, managers owe fiduciary duties to some
subset of the company’s primary stakeholders and must balance the
legitimate interests of each when making business decisions. 14 Importantly,
stakeholder primacy does not imply that managers do not take corporate
profits into account when choosing to undertake a project. Even though
managers seek to maximize the joint welfare of a larger set of corporate
stakeholders—however defined—this maximization must be achieved by
balancing the interests of all relevant stakeholders, including the firm’s
stockholders whose interests are assumed to align with the profitability of
the firm.

12. See, e.g., R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A
New Perspective on Corporate Governance, 25 CAL. MGMT. REV. 88, 89 (1983); R. EDWARD
FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT : A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (2010).
13. See Freeman & Reed, supra note 12, at 89; see also James E. Post et al., Managing
the Extended Enterprise: The New Stakeholder View, 45 CAL. MGMT. REV. 6, 8 (2002)
(defining corporate stakeholders as “individuals and constituencies that contribute, either
voluntarily or involuntarily, to [a company’s] wealth-creating capacity and activities, and
who are therefore its potential beneficiaries and/or risk bearers”); cf. Samantha Miles,
Stakeholders: Essentially Contested or Just Confused?, 108 J. BUS. ETHICS 285, 290 (2012)
(noting that the nature of what constitutes a corporate stakeholder is highly contested, with
numerous definitions existing in the existing academic literature).
14. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 95–102 (2012);
Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on
Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1613 (2006). Many have questioned whether
corporate managers can feasibly solve this type of joint welfare maximization program. See,
e.g., Jensen, supra note 11, at 14 (stating that stakeholder theory provides no guidance as to
how corporate managers are to adjudicate among stakeholders’ disparate interests); Elaine
Sternberg, The Defects of Stakeholder Theory, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE : AN INT’L REV. 3, 4
(1997) (noting that directors may not always be aware of what stakeholders consider a
benefit); Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis, 1 BUS. ETHICS
Q. 53, 66 (1991) (asserting that the stakeholder approach is likely to push “decision-making
towards paralysis because of the dilemmas posed by divided loyalties and, in the final
analysis, represents nothing less than the conversion of the modern private corporation into a
public institution”); Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What
It Takes?, 9 RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 249, 269–98 (2010).
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As highlighted in Table 1, stakeholder primacy, as a form of corporate
social responsibility, fundamentally differs from shareholder primacy in
that a manager can take a corporate action that does not maximize corporate
profits. For instance, in the case of our hypothetical toothpaste
manufacturer, stakeholder primacy implies that the company can choose the
high-cost technology even if this decision does not maximize shareholder
value (e.g., the use of the high-cost technology leads to lower profits and, in
turn, lower share prices). The firm can voluntarily choose to internalize the
negative pollution externalities produced by its manufacturing process,
foregoing private returns to its stockholders, to reduce broader social costs
in the form of environmental harm (where these social costs are assumed to
exceed the private benefits to shareholders). By adopting stakeholder
primacy as its organizing model of corporate governance, the firm
maximizes social welfare in prioritizing the local environment, qua
stakeholder, over the firm’s stockholders. 15 Such corporate action is not
feasible under a shareholder primacy model of corporate governance in
which a manager must maximize corporate profits (i.e., must choose the
low-cost production technology).
2. ESG Criteria
Table 1 distinguishes between expenditures on corporate social
responsibility that maximize corporate profits and those that do not. If the
firm’s business practices benefit other corporate stakeholders at the expense
of the firm’s shareholders, then the firm, having adopted stakeholder
primacy as its operating model of corporate governance, is characterized as

15. Whether this form of profit-sacrificing is sustainable in the long run in the face of
competitive pressures is an important empirical question. See generally Armen A. Alchian,
Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950) (critiquing the
use of profit maximization as a guide to action in economic analysis); Morris Altman, The
Methodology of Economics and the Survival Principle Revisited and Revised: Some Welfare
and Public Policy Implications of Modeling the Economic Agent, 57 REV. SOC. ECON. 427
(1999) (revisiting profit maximization using behavioral economics). In many cases, a firm
that spends money on corporate social responsibility will have to raise prices, reduce wages
or other costs of production, accept smaller profits, or pay smaller dividends. Forest L.
Reinhardt et al., Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens, 2 REV. ENV’T
ECON. & POL’Y 219, 235 (2008) (“Other short-term economic consequences may include
loss of market share, increased insurance costs, increased borrowing costs, and loss of
reputation. In the long term, the firm may face shareholder litigation, corporate takeover, or
closure.”).
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truly motivated by ethical or moral considerations. 16 If the firm’s
expenditures on corporate social responsibility, however, maximize
corporate profits, then the firm is motivated not by ethical or moral
considerations, but by corporate profits, and specifically, by reputation or
brand management. Such expenditures on corporate social responsibility
can be described as standard profit maximization where this optimization is
performed subject to certain binding ESG constraints, defined as a set of
standards related to a company’s business operations that socially conscious
stakeholders use to screen or evaluate firms. 17
For many companies, especially large publicly traded corporations, the
corporate brand is one of the company’s most important corporate assets. 18
Because a firm’s brand is a function of how the company is perceived by
others, a firm must often focus on certain external corporate stakeholders if
it wishes to strengthen its corporate brand, expending costly corporate
resources to satisfy the needs or wants of those stakeholders whose
perceptions determine the strength of its corporate brand or market
reputation.19 Under this category of corporate social responsibility, the
firm’s focus on corporate stakeholders other than the firm’s stockholders is
simply a rational investment in the company’s brand, image, or reputation,
no different than any other investment in a corporate asset. As in any
financial investment, a firm is willing to forego private returns to
shareholders in the short term because the company rationally expects these
costs to generate a profit for its stockholders in the long term. 20
Formally, a firm can be modeled as maximizing corporate profits subject
to certain ESG constraints. Although the set of ethical constraints imposed
upon a firm can relate to any aspect of its business, ESG constraints, as the
name suggests, pertain to three basic factors used to measure a firm’s social
16. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 733, 744–45 (2005) (defining corporate social responsibility as sacrificing profits in
the social interest).
17. See Witold Henisz et al., Five Ways that ESG Creates Value, MCKINSEY Q. (Nov.
14, 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/
our-insights/five-ways-that-esg-creates-value.
18. Blair Brady, Your Brand Is Your Greatest Asset, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2020, 6:15 AM
EST), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagencycouncil/2020/02/24/your-brand-is-yourgreatest-asset/?sh=4a39a6a063b7.
19. See generally Maria João Louro & Paulo Vieira Cunha, Brand Management
Paradigms, 17 J. MKTG. MGMT. 849 (2010).
20. See, e.g., Robert Eccles et al., Is Sustainability Now the Key to Corporate Success?,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2012, 11:52 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/
sustainability-key-corporate-success.
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impact: (1) environmental, (2) social, and (3) governance. 21 Importantly, the
firm’s stakeholders (e.g., consumers, investors) are concerned about these
criteria not because these stakeholders believe that a firm that is similarly
concerned about these criteria is, on average, more profitable or produces
superior products compared to a firm that does not. Rather, the ESG criteria
concern these stakeholders because of their individual preferences that are
not simply a function of price or return on investment but include other
variables related to social impact, such as sustainability or diversity of
board composition. 22 Indeed, if a relationship exists between consideration
of ESG criteria and financial performance, then, as was true of a public
corporation, the consideration of ESG criteria would not implicate business
ethics; instead, it would correspond to self-interested profit or utility
maximization no different than the consideration of any other variable with
the potential to improve an investment or consumption decision.
Specifically, ESG criteria can operate as a binding constraint on profit
maximization through three main external channels. First, if a firm
consistently flouts societal norms and imposes large social costs on local
communities (e.g., in the form of pollution), then the government may
respond by enacting laws or regulations proscribing such behavior. These
laws and regulations can limit a firm’s freedom to operate as it so chooses
and can lead to lower corporate profits if the regulatory interventions are
not optimally designed. 23 Second, for firms catering to a more socially
conscious clientele, the failure to satisfy societal norms, even if the conduct
is otherwise legal, can result in decreased sales and, in turn, lower corporate
profits.24 Third, investors may choose not to invest in firms viewed as
socially irresponsible, raising the firm’s effective cost of capital. 25 Applying
pressure through these external channels, socially conscious ESG
stakeholders can compel a firm to internalize the social costs generated by
21. See generally JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE
21ST CENTURY BUSINESS (1998). Areas of environmental concern are broad and include
greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity, waste management, and depletion of scarce natural
resources. Areas of social concern include diversity and inclusion, consumer protection, and
animal rights. Areas of corporate governance concern include management structure (e.g.,
split roles of CEO and Chairperson) and executive or employee compensation.
22. See id.
23. See Henisz et al., supra note 17.
24. See, e.g., Lois A. Mohr et al., Do Consumers Expect Companies to Be Socially
Responsible? The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Buying Behavior, 35 J.
CONSUMER AFFS. 45, 67–68 (2001).
25. See, e.g., Joshua Graff Zivin & Arthur Small, A Modigliani–Miller Theory of
Altruistic Corporate Social Responsibility, 5 TOPICS IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1 (2005).
OF
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its business operations. Unlike in a stakeholder primacy model, where a
firm voluntarily chooses the socially optimal outcome at the financial
expense of its stockholders, a firm, in this case, chooses the socially optimal
outcome as a rational, profit-maximizing response to external constraints
imposed upon it by its socially conscious corporate stakeholders. The key
driver of socially responsible corporate behavior is not the firm itself, but
market forces external to the firm. 26 Accordingly, this specific category of
corporate social responsibility is best described not as a fundamentally new
model of corporate governance, but rather as an investor or consumer
phenomenon that can potentially force companies to alter their existing
business practices for the benefit of other corporate stakeholders, including
the environment, and society more broadly.
B. Expressive Expenditures
As Table 1 highlights, corporate social responsibility often requires a
public business corporation to engage in some type of corporate speech, be
it directly through marketing activities, or indirectly through corporate
contributions to philanthropic organizations (as defined here). Specifically,
Table 1 distinguishes between expenditures on corporate social
responsibility that are “expressive” and “inexpressive.” Expressive
expenditures are defined as expenditures on corporate social responsibility
in which the company engages in some form of protected speech.
Inexpressive expenditures are defined as corporate expenditures that are not
expressive. In general, expressive expenditures on corporate social
responsibility take two main forms: (1) marketing activities or (2) corporate
contributions. Most straightforwardly, expressive expenditures encompass
marketing activities in which the company makes some form of
communication directly to the public, typically to its consumers or
investors—for example, corporate spending on mass-market advertising.
Marketing activities, however, are more broadly defined here, as discussed
in greater detail in Section IV.A, to also include corporate spending on
social or political issues unrelated to the company’s business.
In addition to marketing activities, expressive expenditures also comprise
contributions to charitable or political organizations that seek to promote or
otherwise advance specific social or political issues. This can be seen in
issue advocacy groups, like the ACLU, or certain types of political action
committees, like Super PACs.27 In Buckley v. Valeo,28 the U.S. Supreme
26. See id. at 5.
27. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
28. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Court rejected the idea that restrictions on contributions to such
organizations merely limit conduct: “[T]his Court has never suggested that
the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates
itself to . . . reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First
Amendment.”29 To support the connection between contributions and
protected speech, the Court stated that organizations seeking to advance a
social or political issue typically must possess sufficient financial resources
to effectively promote or communicate that issue to the public: “[V]irtually
every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the
expenditure of money.”30 Because money is often a precondition for
speech, placing restrictions on contributions to organizations that engage in
protected speech can be reasonably expected to result in less speech by
these organizations, which in turn “necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” 31 Even though the
relationship to speech is less direct because money is used for expressive
purposes by the recipient of the money, and not the donor, contributions to
organizations that seek to promote social or political issues nevertheless
constitute—as an “indispensable” component of these organizations’
communicative efforts—speech, and not conduct; therefore, these
contributions are classified as expressive expenditures under the typography
set forth in Table 1.32
1. Marketing Activities
Table 1 classifies marketing activities according to whether this spending
on corporate social responsibility (1) maximizes corporate profits (i.e.,
cause marketing), or (2) does not maximize corporate profits (i.e., advocacy
marketing).

29. Id. at 16–17 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964))
(noting that a citizen sending a telegram to a public official—a clearly protected activity—
requires spending money).
30. Id. at 19.
31. Id.
32. See id. Expressive expenditures are defined to also include corporate contributions
to charitable organizations that seek to redistribute scarce resources rather than promote
specific social or political issues. The claim is that the expenditure communicates to those
aware of the corporate contribution a broader corporate ideology that approves of specific
redistributive public policies.
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a) Cause Marketing
Cause marketing is defined as a type of expenditure on corporate social
responsibility in which a firm seeks to maximize profits by highlighting
specific social causes in the marketing of its products or services. 33 In
general, cause marketing takes two forms: (1) cause promotion and (2)
corporate social marketing. 34 Cause promotion is defined as a companyfunded issue advocacy campaign in which a firm has a financial selfinterest, targeting consumers of its products or services to increase sales
and, in turn, corporate profits. 35 In some cases, this financial self-interest is
direct and obvious—for example, when The Body Shop, a retailer of
“cruelty-free” cosmetic products, promoted a ban to stop testing cosmetics
on animals. 36 In other cases, cause promotions simply attempt to establish
an affinity with a target market—for example, Pantene’s “Strong is
Beautiful” marketing campaign that encourages African American women
to embrace their strong and unique hair as beautiful. 37
33. See Scott M. Smith & David S. Alcorn, Cause Marketing: A New Direction in the
Marketing of Corporate Responsibility, J. CONSUMER M KTG., Mar. 1, 1991, at 19, 20–21.
34. See PHILIP KOTLER ET AL., GOOD WORKS! 49–81, 111–38 (2012). Lobbying can be
considered a third type of cause marketing operating at the level of the individual, in which a
corporation lawfully seeks to influence a government official, such as a legislator or member
of a regulatory agency. Although lobbying activities may be motivated by interests other
than the firm’s shareholders, studies have shown that corporations tend to engage in
lobbying activities to maximize shareholder value. See, e.g., Raquel Alexander et al.,
Measuring Rates of Return on Lobbying Expenditures: An Empirical Case Study of Tax
Breaks for Multinational Corporations, 25 J.L. & POL. 401, 404 (2009) (finding “an average
return in excess of $220 for every $1 spent on lobbying, or 22,000 percent”); Money and
Politics: Ask What Your Country Can Do for You, ECONOMIST (Oct. 1, 2011), https://www.
economist.com/finance-and-economics/2011/10/01/money-and-politics (citing a study by an
investment-research firm, Strategas, concluding that political lobbying is a “spectacular
investment” yielding “blistering” returns); see also Samuel Issacharoff, On Political
Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 132 (2010) (“[L]obbying is a more effective means of
securing desired ends, and the amounts spent on lobbying rather than on campaign activities
(even in states that permit contributions) reflect corporate understanding that the work of
securing a compliant government is best carried out in the legislative rather than electoral
arena.”). See generally ROBERT G. KAISER, SO DAMN MUCH MONEY: THE TRIUMPH OF
LOBBYING AND THE CORROSION OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2010) (noting that lobbying
appears to be a primary means of corporate political activity, with corporate contributions
acting more as complementary activity).
35. See KOTLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 49–81.
36. See Forever Against Animal Testing, BODY SHOP, https://www.thebodyshop.
com/en-au/about-us/activism/faat/a/a00018 (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
37. See Barrett J. Brunsman, P&G Launches Ad Campaign to Remedy Bias Against
African-Americans, CINCINNATI BUS. COURIER (Mar. 23, 2017, 1:33 PM EDT), https://www.
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Corporate social marketing, by contrast, constitutes a behavior-change
marketing campaign intended to improve public health, safety, or the
environment.38 In this case, a firm acts in a financially self-interested
manner not to increase sales directly, but rather to reduce specific forms of
product misuse that may result in laws or regulations that negatively impact
the firm’s profitability. The intended outcome of this marketing initiative is
behavior change, not increased sales. 39 Beer companies, for example,
engage in corporate social marketing in urging customers to “drink
responsibly.”40 Likewise, mobile phone companies engage in corporate
social marketing in urging customers not to text while driving. 41 These
marketing campaigns are expressly intended to support or influence a
specific public behavior related to consumer misuse of a product or service
(e.g., drinking responsibly, not texting while driving) that, if adopted by a
sufficient number of people, decreases the likelihood of unprofitable
government intervention to reduce the social harm created by such misuse.
b) Advocacy Marketing
Unlike cause marketing, advocacy marketing is defined as a type of
marketing strategy in which a firm no longer seeks to maximize corporate
profits in highlighting specific social causes. A company engages in
advocacy marketing without a profit-maximization motive; rather, the firm
spends corporate funds on such marketing activities to promote the personal
convictions of its corporate managers or other stakeholders of the firm at
the expense of the firm’s stockholders. In general, advocacy marketing
takes two distinct forms: (1) express advocacy or (2) issue advocacy.42
Express advocacy is defined as a marketing campaign in which a
company makes communications expressly advocating for the election or
defeat of one or more clearly identified candidates (or ballot measures). 43
bizjournals.com/cincinnati/news/2017/03/23/p-g-launches-ad-campaign-to-remedy-biasagainst.html.
38. See KOTLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 111.
39. See id. at 113.
40. See, e.g., HEINEKEN, Enjoy Heineken® Responsibly, https://www.heineken.com/
global/en/enjoy-responsibly (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
41. See, e.g., Magdalena Cismaru & Kate Nimegeers, “Keep Your Eyes Up, Don’t Text
and Drive”: A Review of Anti-Texting While Driving Campaigns’ Recommendations, 14
INT’L REV. ON PUB. & NONPROFIT MKTG. 113, 113–14 (2017).
42. See Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Pol. Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d
1174, 1187 (10th Cir. 2000) (discussing the distinctions between permissible restrictions on
express advocacy and issue advocacy).
43. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (2021).
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Under federal election law, corporations may support (or oppose)
candidates by making independent expenditures, which are expenditures for
a communication (1) that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate (or ballot measure) and (2) “that is not made in
cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion
of” any candidate, the candidate’s authorized committees or agents, or a
political party committee or its agents. 44 If the advocacy effort of a
corporation is “coordinated” in this manner, then the expenditure is
considered an in-kind contribution to the candidate, contravening the
Federal Election Campaign Act, which expressly prohibits a corporation
from making contributions to electoral candidates. 45
Issue advocacy, by contrast, can be defined as a communication that does
not contain express advocacy. 46 Because the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley
v. Valeo47 limited the reach of campaign finance laws to express advocacy,
the First Amendment shields issue advocacy from government regulation. 48
In footnote 52 of the Buckley opinion, the Supreme Court listed eight words
or phrases as illustrative of speech that qualifies as express advocacy.
Speakers who did not invoke any of the eight specific words or phrases of
Buckley, or similar language expressly calling voters to vote for or against a
candidate, were exempt from campaign finance laws. 49 Revisiting this
difference, however, in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,50 the
Supreme Court ruled that “magic words” are “functionally meaningless,”
because an advertiser can still communicate its intention to voters without
them. 51 In lieu of a bright-line rule, the Court set forth the functionalequivalent test: if a communication has “no reasonable interpretation other
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate,” then the
communication is “the functional equivalent of express advocacy.” 52
2. Corporate Contributions
Like marketing activities, Table 1 further classifies corporate
contributions according to whether this spending on corporate social
44. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.16.
45. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(a).
46. See Davidson, 236 F.3d at 1187.
47. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
48. Id. at 44–49.
49. Id. at 44 n.52 (listing “vote for,” “elect,” “support,” “cast your ballot for,” “Smith
for Congress,” “vote against,” “defeat,” “reject,” or any variations thereof).
50. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
51. Id. at 217.
52. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007).
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responsibility (1) maximizes corporate profits (i.e., cause-related
contributions) or (2) does not maximize corporate profits (i.e., philanthropic
contributions).
a) Cause-Related Contributions
A cause-related contribution is defined as a type of expressive
expenditure on corporate social responsibility in which a corporation
contributes to a corporate partner, often a non-profit organization, with the
intention of maximizing corporate profits. 53 Under this type of partnership,
a company contributes to a partner charitable organization based upon sales
of its product or service. 54 In addition to strengthening its corporate brand
or reputation, a company can benefit from cause-related contributions in
several ways. For example, corporate support of local causes can improve
the quality of life in communities in which the company does business,
helping the company build productive relationships with government
officials and community leaders that reduce expected regulatory obstacles. 55
A firm can use cause-related contributions to improve economic conditions
in developing or otherwise low-income regions, with the long-term business
objective of increasing the size and quality of its customer base. 56 Further, a
commitment to philanthropy can greatly facilitate efforts to recruit talented

53. See P. Rajan Varadarajan & Anil Menon, Cause-Related Marketing: A Coalignment
of Marketing Strategy and Corporate Philanthropy, 52 J. MKTG. 58, 60 (1988) (defining
cause-related contributions as “the process of formulating and implementing marketing
activities that are characterized by an offer from the firm to contribute a specified amount to
a designated cause when customers engage in revenue-providing exchanges that satisfy
organizational and individual objectives”).
54. Often credited as the first to use the phrase “cause-related” contributions, American
Express, in 1983, pledged to donate to the Statue of Liberty Renovation Fund one cent for
each use of its credit card and one dollar for each new card issued. Matthew Berglind &
Cheryl Nakata, Cause-Related Marketing: More Buck than Bang?, 48 BUS. HORIZONS 443,
445 (2005). The campaign was a financial success: American Express raised over one
million dollars for the cause and produced a 28% increase in American Express card usage
and a 17% increase in card applications. Id.
55. See David P. Baron, Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and
Integrated Strategy, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 7, 7–8 (2001); see also Witold J.
Henisz et al., Spinning Gold: The Financial Returns to Stakeholder Engagement, 35
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1727, 1742–44 (2014) (finding that mining companies that gained the
trust of regulatory authorities through social-engagement activities were able to extract gold
with less regulatory costs or delays).
56. See Baruch Lev et al., Is Doing Good Good for You? How Corporate Charitable
Contributions Enhance Revenue Growth, 31 STRATEGIC M GMT. J. 182, 185 (2010).
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employees with socially conscious preferences or to bond such employees
to the company.57
b) Philanthropic Contributions
Unlike cause-related contributions, a philanthropic contribution is
defined as an expressive expenditure on corporate social responsibility that
does not maximize corporate profits: like advocacy marketing, a
philanthropic contribution is made without a profit-maximization motive.
Instead, the company contributes to another organization for some other
reason, such as to promote the personal ideological agenda of individual
corporate managers (or other stakeholders of the firm). 58 Philanthropic
contributions take one of two forms based upon the intended beneficiary:
(1) charitable contributions or (2) political contributions.
Charitable contributions can be defined as philanthropic contributions to
501(c)(3)59 charitable organizations, sometimes made through a distinct
corporate foundation. These donations are tax-deductible and can be in the
form of direct cash payments or non-cash contributions.60 Political
contributions, by contrast, are defined as philanthropic contributions to
certain types of political action committees and are not tax-deductible
(because the IRS does not consider political action committees to be
qualifying organizations for the purposes of federal income taxes). 61 Under
federal election law, corporations are generally prohibited from using
general treasury funds to make contributions directly to candidates,
accounts of political party committees, or standard political action
committees (“PACs”).62 Corporations can, however, contribute to “special”
57. See id. at 183–84; see also Alex Edmans, The Link Between Job Satisfaction and
Firm Value, with Implications for Corporate Social Responsibility, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP.,
Nov. 2012, at 1, 1 (finding that companies that made Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to
Work For” list generated 2.3% to 3.8% higher stock returns per year compared to relevant
peer group).
58. See KOTLER & LEE, supra note 7, at 23–24, 144–45.
59. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
60. See 26 U.S.C. § 170. Examples of non-cash contributions can include donation of
new or used equipment or supplies, use of a company’s administrative services or facilities,
or receipt of pro bono work in the form of professional services or more general companyorganized volunteer activities. KOTLER & LEE, supra note 7, at 146.
61. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(e)(1); see also I.R.S. Pub. 529 (Dec. 2020), http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-pdf/p529.pdf (stating that corporations cannot “deduct contributions made to a
political candidate [or] a campaign committee”).
62. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(a) (2021). Races for non-federal offices are governed by state
and local law. Over half the states allow some level of corporate contributions to non-federal
offices. See Campaign Contribution Limits: Overview, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES
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political action committees established solely to finance independent
expenditures (i.e., Super PACs).63 Super PACs, officially known as
“independent expenditure-only political committee[s],” can raise and spend
unlimited amounts of money to advocate for or against any candidate or
political issue as long as there is no coordination, consultation, or request
by any electoral campaign or candidate.64
III. Proposed Solutions to Agency Cost Problem
Over time, the U.S. Supreme Court has gradually expanded the speech
rights of public business corporations under the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution. These expanded speech rights have enabled public
corporations to spend more on corporate social responsibility in the form of
expressive expenditures. 65 As others have cautioned, this type of spending
on corporate speech, especially with respect to social or political issues
unrelated to the company’s business, allows corporate managers to promote
individual pet social or political causes at the expense of profit
maximization.66 In his dissent in Citizens United, Justice Stevens warned
(Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaign-contribu
tion-limits-overview.aspx.
63. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010); SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599
F.3d 686, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc); Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121, 135 (D.D.C.
2011).
64. See FEC Op. 2010-11 (July 22, 2010). Public corporations can also make
contributions to 501(c) “dark money” groups that are distinct from Super PACs. These “dark
money” groups refer to 501(c)(4) (social welfare), 501(c)(5) (unions), and 501(c)(6) (trade
association) nonprofit organizations. See John Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen,
Political Campaign and Lobbying Activities of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6)
Organizations, I.R.S. (2003), at L-2 to L-3, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf.
Although both types of closely related entities can raise and spend unlimited sums of money
if there is no coordination with political parties or candidates, a Super PAC must disclose its
donors, while 501(c) groups, with a few limited exceptions, are not required to make such
disclosures. Compare 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b), with 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c). Moreover, unlike
Super PACs, 501(c) groups may engage in political activities only if these activities do not
become the group’s “primary” activity. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2) (2021).
65. See supra Section II.B.
66. See generally CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE
GIVING (1985). Managers can reap personal benefits from expenditures on corporate social
responsibility in several ways. Even if a gift is fully funded with company money, the
corporate manager often receives some credit—these awards, honors, and accolades provide
the manager with a psychic benefit and can elevate the manager’s status in elite social
circles. See James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of
Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464–65 (1990). In addition, a corporate manager can
use corporate philanthropic donations to advance a personal ideological agenda or pet
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that when managers use general treasury funds on corporate social
responsibility to advance specific social or political issues, the company’s
shareholders, as residual claimants, are “effectively footing the bill” and
may be forced to engage in “a kind of coerced speech” in which a
corporation promotes social or political causes that do not represent the
ideological viewpoints of the firm’s shareholders.67 This divergence
between the ideological preferences of a public business corporation, as
expressed or promoted through its spending on corporate speech, and those
of its shareholders exemplifies the core agency cost problem at the heart of
the modern corporation. The misalignment of incentives between managers
and shareholders created by the separation of ownership and control 68 is
unavoidably implicated when a public business corporation is granted
expansive speech rights that enable corporations to spend shareholder
money to promote social or political issues. 69
charity. See William O. Brown et al., Corporate Philanthropic Practices, 12 J. CORP. FIN.
855, 856 (2006). Also, corporate managers may use corporate philanthropy to divert public
attention from reported negative financial results or to buy goodwill after the firm has been
required to restate earnings. See Daryl Koehn & Joe Ueng, Is Philanthropy Being Used by
Corporate Wrongdoers to Buy Good Will?, 14 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 1, 14 (2009).
67. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 475 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
68. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309
(1976); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986).
69. Although the existing empirical literature is by no means conclusive, several studies
suggest that corporate contributions can be motivated by interests other than the firm’s
stockholders and do not maximize shareholder value. See, e.g., Anthony Fowler et al., Quid
Pro Quo? Corporate Returns to Campaign Contributions, 82 J. POL. 844, 854, 856 (2020)
(finding no evidence that a corporate donation to a candidate produces monetary benefits if
that candidate wins the election); Hao Liang & Luc Renneboog, Corporate Donations and
Shareholder Value, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 278, 307 (2017) (finding that political
contributions do not appear to enhance shareholder value); CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CORPORATE CAMPAIGN SPENDING: GIVING SHAREHOLDERS A VOICE
9
(2010),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Corpor
ate-Campaign-Spending-Giving-Shareholders-Voice.pdf (“[H]igh levels of political
spending are a trademark of poor corporate management, and that ‘managers willing to
squander small sums on political giving are likely to squander larger sums elsewhere.’”
(quoting Rajesh Aggarwal, Felix Meschke, & Tracy Wang, Corporate Political
Contributions: Investment or Agency? 39 (June 25, 2009) (unpublished manuscript)); John
C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens United,
9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 688 (2012) (finding corporate political contributions to be
negatively correlated with measures of shareholder power, positively correlated with signs of
agency costs, and negatively correlated with shareholder value).
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To justify its gradual expansion of corporate speech protected by the
First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has identified as a check on
managerial discretion—and agency costs more generally—three principal
categories of disciplining mechanisms: (1) free market forces, (2) mandated
disclosure, and (3) corporate democracy. As others have argued, this Article
contends that, for the most part, these disciplining mechanisms are not up to
the task.
A. Free Market Forces
Courts have argued that free market economic forces can act as a natural
disciplining mechanism to prevent expenditures on corporate social
responsibility that are motivated by interests other than corporate
stockholders. In both Bellotti and Citizens United, for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court noted that ownership of corporate stock is voluntary and
that dissatisfied shareholders can freely choose to sell their shares in the
company if displeased with its corporate speech. 70 Rather than engage in
acts of corporate democracy, such as proxy fights or shareholder
proposals—which, as discussed below, are costly, risky, and timeconsuming—shareholders can express their dissatisfaction with spending
on corporate speech by simply selling their shares (i.e., doing the “Wall
Street Walk”).71 The claim is that the sale of shares, or the threat thereof,
especially by large institutional investors, puts downward pressure on a
firm’s stock price that can materially impact the behavior of its corporate
managers. In this way, free market exchange itself becomes a form of
shareholder activism. 72

70. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (stating that a
corporate shareholder “invests in a company at his own volition and is free to withdraw his
investment at any time and for any reason” (internal brackets omitted)); Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 370–71.
71. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of
Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 41 (1993) (describing the “Wall Street Rule”)
(“[I]t is more efficient to sell a particular stock than it is to try to reform the company.”);
Michael S. Kang, Shareholder Voting as Veto, 88 IND. L.J. 1299, 1308 (2013). See generally
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 4 (1970). Hirschman argues that a
member of an organization has two possible responses when confronted with decreasing
benefits of membership: (1) exit (withdraw from the relationship) or (2) voice (attempt to
repair or improve the relationship through communication of the complaint, grievance, or
proposal for change). Id.
72. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and
Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2645, 2646 (2009).
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Such free market forces, however, are unlikely to act as a meaningful
check on management for several reasons. As an initial matter, limitations
on required corporate disclosures substantially impair a shareholder’s
ability to obtain the information necessary to make an informed decision to
sell.73 Moreover, even if a shareholder learns of objectionable spending on
corporate social responsibility, the “Wall Street Walk” permits a
shareholder “only to escape continued unauthorized use of corporate
resources” through the sale of his securities. 74 This sale does not necessarily
curtail the activity or provide a remedy for prior unauthorized use. 75 In
addition, selling shares in response to objectionable corporate speech is
unlikely to have a significant disciplining effect on management unless a
large number of shareholders all sell at roughly the same point in time. For
this to occur, a large group of stockholders must be willing to forego the
future economic benefits of stock ownership—in the form of dividend
payments and stock price appreciation—in exchange for the more
ephemeral psychic benefits of having sold the company’s stock in a
principled act of quiet protest.76 Finally, even if a coordinated sell-off
causes the company’s stock price to drop, management may not know the
reason.77 This disconnect can occur if shareholders have no means of
communicating to management that the sell-off was prompted by certain
expenditures on corporate social responsibility.78 Indeed, orchestrating such
a concerted shareholder sell-off in the first instance is extremely unlikely
given the regulatory obstacles shareholders of public business corporations
confront in seeking to communicate (and coordinate) with each other.79

73. See discussion infra Section III.B.
74. See Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance:
Incorporating Corporate Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 58 (2001).
75. Id. at 58–59. In addition, selling shares does not serve to punish the corporation by
depleting its capital: “An exiting shareholder does not ‘reclaim’ his capital investment from
the corporation but merely sells his investment to a new shareholder.” Id. at 59.
76. See id. at 58–59. Shareholders may also incur a tax penalty if shares are sold from
within a pension plan. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 72(t)(1), (2)(A)(i) (noting that a 10% additional tax
will be imposed on distributions from 401(k) plans that are made before the employee attains
the age of fifty-nine-and-one-half).
77. Joo, supra note 74, at 58.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 58–59.
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B. Mandated Disclosure
In addition to free market forces, courts have offered disclosure as
another possible disciplining mechanism. In Citizens United, for example,
Justice Kennedy described the free flow of information as empowering
shareholders to protect their financial self-interests, optimistically
explaining the potential of modern campaign finance systems as follows:
With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of
expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the
information needed to hold corporations and elected officials
accountable for their positions and supporters. Shareholders can
determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances
the corporation’s interest in making profits, and citizens can see
whether elected officials are “‘in the pocket’ of so-called
moneyed interests.” The First Amendment protects political
speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react
to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.80
Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy’s sanguine view of the future of corporate
disclosure does not match present reality. Under existing federal securities
law, a manager of a public company is not required to disclose to the
stockholders of the corporation information materially related to its
corporate contributions.81 Likewise, state corporate laws, which tend to
encourage corporate philanthropy, also generally do not require
management to disclose corporate contributions to the company’s
shareholders.82 Even if philanthropic spending must be reported to a
government agency, such as corporate contributions to a Super PAC, a
public corporation generally has no legal duty to share this information with
its shareholders in a readily accessible manner, such as in a Form 10-K
annual report.83 Accordingly, given this lack of public access to
information, 84 shareholders of a public corporation, as a group, are
80. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370–71 (2010) (citation omitted) (quoting
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 259 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
81. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate
Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 930–37 (2013).
82. See John A. Pearce II, The Rights of Shareholders in Authorizing Corporate
Philanthropy, 60 VILL. L. REV. 251, 253–54 (2015).
83. TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 69, at 12; see also Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note
81, at 935–36.
84. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 81, at 935. Further contributing to the lack of
transparency regarding campaign finance, a Super PAC must report its donors to the Federal
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generally uninformed as to the extent to which their capital investments are
used to promote specific social or political issues, and they do not have the
information necessary to act as an effective check on managerial discretion
by punishing managers in some manner when objectionable spending on
corporate speech is identified or discovered. 85
C. Corporate Democracy
Finally, courts have relied upon “corporate democracy” as a potential
disciplining mechanism on managerial discretion. In Citizens United,
Justice Kennedy dismissed the concern that greater corporate speech rights
may harm the shareholders of public companies, stating that there was
“little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through
the procedures of corporate democracy.’”86 Here, corporate democracy
refers to two distinct corporate governance mechanisms: (1) derivative suits
for breach of corporate fiduciary duties and (2) shareholder voting. 87

Election Commission, but the original source of contributed funds is not necessarily
disclosed. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42042, SUPER PACS IN FEDERAL
ELECTIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 15 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R42042.pdf. Thus, a corporation can make unlimited donations to a 501(c) “dark
money” group that is not required to publicly disclose funders, which can, in turn, make
unlimited donations to a Super PAC that reports the nonprofit’s donation but not the original
contribution of the donor corporation. See Kim Barker & Marian Wang, Super-PACs and
Dark Money: ProPublica’s Guide to the New World of Campaign Finance, PROPUBLICA
(July 11, 2011, 12:38 PM EDT), https://www.propublica.org/article/super-pacs-propublicasguide-to-the-new-world-of-campaign-finance.
85. To provide shareholders with greater information related to corporate contributions,
several commentators have argued that federal securities law should mandate public
companies disclose such spending directly to shareholders. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson,
supra note 81, at 950–53. In addition, members of Congress have introduced legislation
seeking to mandate disclosure of corporate contributions. See, e.g., Corporate Charitable
Disclosure Act of 2002, H.R. 3745, 107th Cong. § 2 (requiring disclosure of both amount
and beneficiary of charitable donations by companies required to report under the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 or the Investment Company Act of 1940); Corporate Political
Disclosure Act of 2019, H.R. 1053, 116th Cong. § 2 (seeking to amend the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 to direct the SEC to issue regulations to require public corporations to
disclose political expenditures).
86. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 794 (1978)).
87. See id. at 477 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“By ‘corporate
democracy,’ presumably the Court means the rights of shareholders to vote and to bring
derivative suits for breach of fiduciary duty.”).
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1. Breach of Corporate Fiduciary Duties
In terms of corporate law remedies, corporate contributions are subject to
attack under two separate legal doctrines: (1) ultra vires and (2) breach of
fiduciary duty. Ultra vires is largely irrelevant, however, because almost all
states, including Delaware, have enacted statutes expressly granting
corporations the power to make corporate contributions. 88 These state
statutes typically contain no express limit on the size of permissible gifts,
do not demand director accountability to shareholders, and do not require
board oversight; “managers may approve contributions as they choose, for
any purpose they choose, to whatever qualifying charity they decide, and
without regard to shareholder interests.”89 Moreover, in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.,90 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a business does not
need to solely pursue a profit as a matter of corporate law. 91 The only real
limitation that courts have placed upon expressive expenditures on
corporate social responsibility is that such spending be reasonable both as
to the amount and the purpose for which such expenditures are made. 92
Thus, to challenge the validity of a business decision related to spending
on corporate social responsibility, the best argument available to a
shareholder-plaintiff, absent unusual facts, is that management was
motivated by interests other than the company’s stockholders. Given the
88. See generally Pearce, supra note 82, at 268. Specifically, many states, including
Delaware, provide corporations with power “to make donations for the public welfare or for
charitable, scientific or educational purposes” or some similar variation, with no explicit
requirement that the donation benefit the corporation. Id. at 253 n.15.
89. R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of
Charitable Contributions by Corporations, 54 BUS. LAW. 965, 982 (1999).
90. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
91. Id. at 711–12. Writing for the Court, Justice Alito stated:
While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to
make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to
pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so. Forprofit corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide variety of
charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to further
humanitarian and other altruistic objectives.
Id.
92. See, e.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969)
(considering factors such as whether the contribution fell within a tax deduction in assessing
the reasonableness of a corporate contribution); Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del.
1991) (holding that a defendant-corporation acted within the bounds of the law and was
expressly authorized to make charitable contributions which, in this case, were reasonable
and not excessive given the corporation’s net worth and tax benefits received because of
donation).
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strong judicial protection afforded corporate managers under the business
judgment rule, however, a shareholder-plaintiff cannot simply allege that
management acted with improper motivation. 93 Instead, a plaintiff must
adduce specific evidence in support of this claim—a task made particularly
difficult by how easily management can offer a plausible, yet entirely
pretextual, justification for almost any expenditure on corporate social
responsibility. 94 Absent “smoking gun” evidence of improper self-interest
(e.g., a board that clearly lacks independence), a shareholder-plaintiff will
generally not be able to establish that management intended for the
expressive expenditure at issue to exclusively promote interests other than
the company’s stockholders.95 Justice Stevens echoed this sentiment in his
dissent in Citizens United:
[M]any corporate lawyers will tell you that these rights [i.e., the
rights of shareholders to vote and to bring derivative suits for
breach of fiduciary duty] are so limited as to be almost
nonexistent, given the internal authority wielded by boards and
managers and the expansive protections afforded by the business
judgment rule.96

93. A court will assess a business decision under management-friendly business
judgment review, unless the plaintiff can rebut the business judgment rule presumption that,
in making the business decision, management “acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest[]” of the corporation.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). If plaintiff can rebut this presumption,
then a court will assess the business decision at issue under plaintiff-friendly entire fairness
review. See Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 287 (Del. 2003).
94. See generally Joseph K. Leahy, Intermediate Scrutiny for Corporate Political
Contributions, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1119, 1155–56 (2017) (noting attempts by courts to
“smoke out mere pretextual justifications for improperly motivated decisions”).
95. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Citizens United, Corporate Political Expenditures, and
the Business Judgment Rule, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 24, 2012), http://www.
professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/citizens-united-corporatepolitical-expenditures-and-the-business-judgment-rule.html (stating that it will be “damned
difficult” for a plaintiff challenging such a charitable donation—or an analogous political
contribution—to survive a motion to dismiss because “courts will require considerable
evidence of self-dealing before the business judgment rule will be rebutted”).
96. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 477 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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2. Shareholder Voting
In addition to derivative suits for breach of fiduciary duty, courts have
identified shareholder voting as a second principal component of corporate
democracy.97
a) Limited Access to Proxy Machinery
To exercise control over corporate expressive expenditures, a
shareholder can, in theory, include in the company’s proxy statement, under
Rule 14a-8, proposals requiring a company to disclose its corporate
contributions, as well as its standards for choosing recipients of such
contributions, and requesting that contributions not be made to specific
organizations or specific types of organizations. 98 In practice, however,
most proposals of this kind are excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(7), which
states that a shareholder proposal may be excluded from a company’s proxy
materials if the proposal “deals with matters relating to the [c]ompany’s
ordinary business operations.”99 Under this exclusion, the SEC considers
“the degree to which the proposal seeks to ‘micro-manage’ the company by
probing too deeply into matters of a complex nature upon which
shareholders, as a group, would not be in a position to make an informed
judgment.”100 The SEC staff has consistently granted no-action relief in
cases where a shareholder proposal requests that corporate contributions be
made, or not made, to specific organizations or specific types of
organizations as impermissibly prescriptive under this micromanagement
97. See, e.g., MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del.
2003) (“This Court has repeatedly stated that, if the stockholders are not satisfied with the
management or actions of their elected representatives on the board of directors, the power
of corporate democracy is available to the stockholders to replace the incumbent directors
when they stand for re-election.”).
98. Under Rule 14a-8, a company must include a shareholder proposal in its proxy
statements unless the proponent fails to comply with the rule’s eligibility and procedural
requirements, or the proposal falls within one of thirteen substantive bases for exclusion. See
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2021). Companies seeking to omit a proposal under Rule 14a-8
generally request a “no-action letter” from the Staff of the SEC’s Division of Corporation
Finance seeking the Staff’s concurrence with the company’s conclusion that the SEC may
exclude the shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8. See, e.g., Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC
No-Action Letter Process, 42 BUS. LAW. 1019, 1024 (1987).
99. Notice of Intent Letter from Am. Express Co. to the Office of Chief Counsel, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/
14a-8/2021/ncppramerican022621-14a8.pdf.
100. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 3440018, S7-25-97 (May 21, 1998), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-40018.htm.
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prong of Rule 14a-8(i)(7).101 An individual shareholder can use the
procedures under Rule 14a-8 to include a shareholder proposal in the
company’s proxy materials only if the proposal relates to the company’s
corporate contributions generally, and not to some segment of its corporate
contributions.102 Accordingly, given the SEC’s current strict interpretation
of Rule 14a-8(i)(7) that significantly limits the capacity of shareholders to
access the company’s proxy machinery to correct perceived managerial
abuses, business decisions related to expressive expenditures on corporate
social responsibility remain largely within the discretion of corporate
management. 103
101. See, e.g., No-Action Letter from Matt S. McNair, Office of Chief Counsel, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, to PepsiCo, Inc. (Feb. 24, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/
cf-noaction/14a-8/2010/johnlthoma022410-14a8.pdf (concurring in the exclusion of a
proposal requesting that PepsiCo specifically prohibit financial or other support of “any
organization or philosophy which either rejects or supports homosexuality”) (“Proposals that
concern charitable contributions directed to specific types of organizations are generally
excludable under rule 14a-8(i)(7).”).
102. See, e.g., Shareholder Proposal Letter from Scott Shepard to Rachel A. Gonzalez,
Corp. Sec’y, Starbucks Corp. (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfnoaction/14a-8/2020/ncpprstarbucks110320-14a8-incoming.pdf (stating that a shareholder
proposal will not be excluded “so long as the proposal relates . . . to the corporation’s
charitable contributions generally, rather than merely to some segment of the corporation’s
charitable contributions” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
103. To provide shareholders with greater control over corporate contributions, some
commentators have argued that corporate law should be modified to require managers to
obtain some form of prior authorization from shareholders before making corporate
contributions over certain amounts, citing British law as a legislative model that U.S.
corporate law should emulate, especially in light of the Citizens United decision. See, e.g.,
TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 69, at 16–21. In 2000, the United Kingdom adopted an
amendment to its Companies Act requiring British companies to seek consent from
shareholders before any political donations are made. See Political Parties, Elections and
Referendums Act 2000, c. 41, § 139, sched. 19, § 140, sched. 7 (Eng.), https://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/pdfs/ukpga_20000041_en.pdf (requiring that shareholders
expressly confer authority on the company to spend over £5,000 on political expenditures).
This type of mandated shareholder approval is not new, however. Several members of
Congress have introduced legislation requiring shareholder approval for corporate
contributions. See, e.g., Shareholder Protection Act of 2021, S. 530, 117th Cong. § 3(b)
(seeking to amend the Exchange Act to add requirement that proxy statements contain a
description of any expenditure for political activities proposed for the coming fiscal year that
has not been authorized by shareholder vote, including proposed total amount, and provide
for a separate vote of shareholders to authorize these expenditures); see also H.R. 945, 105th
Cong. (1997) (seeking to amend the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to allow
shareholders the opportunity, based upon their proportional number of shares, to participate
in deciding the recipients of charitable donations).
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b) Myth of Shareholder Democracy
Finally, this subpart explores a broader, more fundamental critique that
can be made of shareholder voting as a disciplining mechanism: the notion
of shareholder democracy ignores the important reality that most investors
in public business corporations cannot plausibly be thought to have joined
together for shared associational reasons unrelated to profit. 104 To start, the
vast majority of shares in U.S. public corporations—approximately 80%—
are owned by large financial institutions, such as pension funds or mutual
funds.105 With the decline of defined-benefit pension plans, most Americans
no longer invest in individual companies but, instead, relinquish some
portion of employment earnings to investment funds in the menu selected
for them by their employer.106 None of these funds, however, suggest that
investments in the fund were made by worker-investors to empower the
fund to actively promote specific social or political issues; none of these
funds advertise themselves as vehicles for political or ideological
expression, and many have their own significant agency problems.107 In
fact, major institutional investors generally recognize that the only shared
104. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465,
1521–22 (2007) (stating that concentration of equity ownership in the hands of a few large
institutional investors has “created a class of shareholders singularly focused on shareholder
value”).
105. See Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L.
493, 498–99 (2018) (“From 1980 to 1996, large institutional investors nearly doubled their
share of ownership of U.S. corporations from under 30% to over 50%. By 2010, institutional
investors held approximately 80% of the U.S. stock market. Mutual funds have been the
largest drivers of this growth: in 1980, they owned $70 billion in assets, and in 2009, that
number was up to $7.2 trillion.”); cf. Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?,
95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2009) (“There is no question that U.S. securities markets are
now dominated by institutional investors.”).
106. See Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of
Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1485 (2015)
(“The menu of mutual funds from which employees choose is ultimately constructed by the
employer.”).
107. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 250 (2014) (“[T]here are socially responsible investment funds that
appear to vote their shares in line with all the other funds of their mutual fund family, and to
take no special efforts to vote in a way that is consistent with the fund’s supposed
commitment to social responsibility.”); see also Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund
Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 796 (1993)
(“[P]ublic pension funds face distinctive investment conflicts that limit the benefits of
[institutional] activism.”).
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interest among investors is in a positive return on the investment in the fund
and rightly assume that investors possess widely disparate political or social
views that, much like a public corporation itself, cannot be reconciled in a
logically coherent way other than by focusing solely on maximizing
investment returns.108
Further, just like investors in pension funds or mutual funds,
shareholders of public business corporations are not monolithic in their
views on social or political issues and do not invest in the stock of public
business corporations for expressive purposes—any public business
corporation that purports to speak on behalf of its shareholders is almost
always speaking on behalf of only a small subset of its shareholders. 109
Indeed, if a large number of individuals hold dissimilar preferences, then
the aggregation of these individual preferences into a coherent system of
collective choice is often logically impossible.110 Profit maximization is the
only objective for which shareholder unanimity can be posited, at least
theoretically.111 Moreover, to the extent that the shareholders of a public
corporation do hold a consensus view on a specific social or political issue,
shareholders do not “send out a human corporate spokesperson” to promote
this issue on their associated behalf. 112 With a few limited exceptions,
shareholders only vote for the directors of the company. 113 Even in states
like Delaware, with a strong focus on shareholder protection, the directors,
not stockholders, determine corporate policy and do not have a fiduciary
108. See Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law,
2019 WIS. L. REV. 451, 502.
109. See generally Erin Miller, What Should Congress Do About Citizens United?,
SCOTUSBLOG.COM (Jan. 24, 2010, 10:30 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/whatshould-congress-do-about-citizens-united/ (“Talking about a business corporation as merely
another way that individuals might choose to organize their association with one another to
pursue their common expressive aims is worse than unrealistic; it obscures the very real
injustice and distortion entailed in the phenomenon of some people using other people’s
money to support candidates they have made no decision to support, or to oppose candidates
they have made no decision to oppose.”).
110. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 70 (1991).
111. See Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV.
923, 961 (1984) (arguing that the pursuit of ends other than profit maximization is
“especially disturbing because profit maximization is the only goal for which we can at least
theoretically posit shareholder unanimity”).
112. See Macey & Strine, supra note 108, at 476.
113. See id. See generally 5 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 2097 (rev. vol. 2019) (“[T]he powers of management vesting in
the shareholders as a body are very few.”).
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duty to satisfy momentary stockholder demands. 114 In general, stockholders
have only limited influence and must engage in a costly, risky, and timeconsuming process to remove directors as part of a concerted effort to
implement a change in corporate policy. 115
For the most part, stockholders of public business corporations are
generally weak compared to corporate managers and are poorly positioned
to constrain management even with respect to key issues, such as executive
compensation.116 And it is this relative weakness, this inability of
shareholders to act as an effective check on corporate managers, that many
have relied upon to justify shareholder primacy and its exclusive focus on
shareholder value.117 Specifically, the claim is that managers must focus
exclusively on maximizing corporate profits subject to external legal and
ethical constraints, because holding managers accountable to shareholders
along this one dimension alone is sufficiently difficult.118 If managers can
instead act for diffuse interests, prioritizing other stakeholders over the
firm’s stockholders, then managerial accountability to the owners of the
company is severely weakened, if not non-existent, insofar as a corporate
manager can now justify any business decision on many different bases: 119
“A manager responsible to two conflicting interests is in fact answerable to

114. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist
Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759,
1762–64 (2006).
115. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA.
L. REV. 675, 688–94 (2007) (documenting the challenges in running a proxy contest);
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489
(1970).
116. See M ARK J. ROE, STRONG M ANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 865–69 (2005) (proposing increased
shareholder power based on an efficiency rationale).
117. See Macey & Strine, supra note 108, at 495–96.
118. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 110, at 70; see also Henry N. Butler &
Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate
Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1225
(1999) (“Corporate managers have enough trouble meeting the challenges of maximizing
shareholder value without diverting their attention to saving the world.”).
119. See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21
STETSON L. REV. 23, 32 (1991) (“[T]he primary beneficiaries of nonshareholder constituency
statutes are incumbent managers, who can justify virtually any decision they make on the
grounds that it benefits some constituency of the firm.” (emphasis omitted)).
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neither.”120 The difficulty shareholders face in monitoring or otherwise
constraining corporate management demands that managerial decisionmaking be confined to the narrow task of profit maximization and that
managers not be allowed to use corporate funds to promote social or
political issues that do not maximize firm profits.121 Profit maximization,
and not issue advocacy, must be the sole purpose of the public business
corporation. 122 As Justice Scalia succinctly stated, “The Campbell Soup
Company does not exist to promote a message.” 123
IV. Corporate Activism
Part IV provides an overview of the law of corporate advocacy,
including a brief survey of commercial speech, and examines the case First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,124 in which the U.S. Supreme Court
held for the first time that corporations have First Amendment speech
protections extending beyond commercial speech and are free to express
opinions on social or political issues unrelated to the company’s business
practices.125 Part IV contends that the corporate advocacy made possible by
Bellotti is often not in the best interests of the company’s shareholders and
refers to such expressive expenditures on corporate social responsibility as
“corporate activism.” Two theoretical justifications are provided for why
this spending on corporate speech is unlikely to maximize shareholder
value: (1) agency costs and (2) free speech as pure conflict. Finally, to
reduce the frequency with which public business corporations engage in
corporate activism, Part IV suggests, as a public policy proposal, that the
SEC encourage public companies that trade on U.S. stock exchanges to
have a “communications committee,” chartered by the board of directors,
responsible for the oversight of all forms of corporate speech.
120. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1192 (1981).
121. See generally id. at 1191–92.
122. See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation,
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 265 (1992) (“The corporation’s purpose is to advance the
purposes of [stockholder-owners] . . . , and the function of directors, as agents of the owners,
is faithfully to advance the financial interests of the owners.”); eBay Domestic Holdings,
Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“The ‘Inc.’ after the company name has to
mean at least that” corporate managers are bound to “promote the value of the corporation
for the benefit of its stockholders.”).
123. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 467 (2008)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
125. Id. at 784.
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A. Overview of Law
This subpart provides an overview of the law of issue advocacy,
providing a brief survey of commercial speech, and examines the Bellotti
case, which expanded corporate speech rights to include speech pertaining
to social or political issues unrelated to the company’s business practices.126
1. Commercial Speech
Prior to 1975, most corporate advertising was not protected under the
First Amendment. The commonly accepted legal principle was that
commercial speech, which the Supreme Court has defined as speech that
“propos[es] a commercial transaction,” was inferior to political speech and
received little, if any, protection under the First Amendment. 127 As the
Court explained in Valentine v. Chrestensen,128 “the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising.”129 In 1975, the Supreme Court in Bigelow v. Virginia130
significantly modified this judicial standard in holding that a Virginia
statute restricting the circulation of an abortion advertisement was
unconstitutional. 131 In the Court’s view, the newspaper advertisement
contained information of clear public interest and value to individuals and
was therefore entitled to First Amendment protection. 132 The next year, in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,133 the Supreme Court expressly overturned Valentine, holding that
commercial speech does not fall outside the protection of the U.S.
Constitution and must be afforded First Amendment protection
commensurate with its position in relation to other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression. 134
Although the Court has agreed that commercial speech is entitled to First
Amendment protection, the Court has also held that commercial speech is
less protected by the First Amendment than other forms of “constitutionally
126. See generally id.
127. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980).
128. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
129. Id. at 54.
130. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
131. Id. at 829.
132. See id. at 825–26 (stating that the First Amendment should prevent states from
prohibiting advertisements of products or conduct that is clearly legal at the place
advertised).
133. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
134. Id. at 765.
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guaranteed expression,” such as political, ideological, or artistic speech, and
that the government may regulate any type of commercial speech that is
“more likely to deceive . . . than to inform.”135 With this grant of regulatory
power, state and federal governments have enacted laws to protect
consumers from false or misleading advertising, including section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act, which prohibits commercial advertising containing false
or misleading descriptions or representations of fact that misrepresent the
nature, qualities, or characteristics of goods, services, or commercial
activities. 136 To state a cause of action under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff
must do more than merely demonstrate that a statement of fact used in
advertising is false or misleading—a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
alleged misrepresentation deceived a substantial portion of the consuming
public and that these misrepresentations were “likely to influence the
purchasing decisions” of consumers. 137 This type of general consumer
deception is often demonstrated through surveys establishing that
consumers were misled by the alleged misrepresentations. 138
Establishing false or misleading advertising is further complicated by the
fact that a business, in its marketing campaigns, is allowed to engage in
“puffery,” which has been described as “a ‘vague statement’ boosting the
appeal of a service or product that, because of its vagueness and
135. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Securities law implements a broadly similar framework. The
SEC, for example, recently alleged that Praxsyn’s press releases, which made claims about
the company’s ability to acquire and supply large quantities of N95 or similar masks, were
false and misleading, and violated section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5, which essentially prohibits, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
both fraud and any untrue statements of material fact (or a failure to disclose material facts).
See SEC Charges Company and CEO for Covid-19 Scam, Litigation Release No. 24807
(Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2020/lr24807.htm.
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
A plaintiff whose claim alleges that a statement is literally false does not need to prove
consumer deception; literally false advertisements are presumptively deceptive. See, e.g., B.
Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 168 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Where the
statement in question is actually false, then the plaintiff need not show that the statement
either actually deceived consumers or was likely to do so.”); Balance Dynamics Corp. v.
Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 683, 693 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Because proof of ‘actual confusion’
can be difficult to obtain, most of the circuits have ruled that when a statement is literally
false, a plaintiff need not demonstrate actual customer deception in order to obtain relief
under the Lanham Act.” (citation omitted)).
138. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir.
1980) (using surveys to establish the consumer deception element of a false advertising
claim).
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unreliability, is immunized from regulation.” 139 The puffery defense in
false-advertising cases protects accused defendant-speakers whose
commercial speech is not factual, meaning that the speech is not capable of
being falsified. 140 In this context, falsifiability is not a question of fact
decided by a jury, but rather a question of law decided by courts and
regulators who have defined the puffery defense categorically as claims that
are “not capable of measurement” and that “consumers would not take
seriously.”141 In support of this approach, these authorities assume that
factual speech can be distinguished from nonfactual speech through an
examination of the speech itself, and that “‘consumers acting reasonably’
are unlikely to be deceived by speech-assertions that are not ‘capable of
measurement.’”142 These assumptions have led courts and regulators to
focus on the specificity of the advertisement itself as the key feature of a
business’s puffery defense under the assumption that “consumer reliance
will be induced by specific rather than general assertions.”143 Hence,
general marketing claims about how the company operates in ways that
make the world a better place that do not reference specific business
practices are unlikely to be found false or misleading and would, therefore,
not be actionable under state or federal law (e.g., under existing law, a
company can engage in potential greenwashing by making the general
claim that its products are “sustainable,” “organic,” or “natural”). 144
139. See David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1397
(2006). In security law, puffery is similarly defined as a “vague statement of corporate
optimism.” See, e.g., Jennifer O’Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Reemergence of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
1697, 1698–99 (1998).
140. See Ivan L. Preston, The Definition of Deceptiveness in Advertising and Other
Commercial Speech, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1035, 1046–47 (1990).
141. See In re Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 321 (1983); see also FTC Policy
Statement on Deception, Letter from James C. Miller, FTC Chairman, to John D. Dingell,
Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Com., U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983)
[hereinafter Statement on Deception], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_
statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf (defining puffery as those claims “that the
ordinary consumers do not take seriously”).
142. See Statement on Deception, supra note 141; Hoffman, supra note 139, at 1402–03
(quoting In re Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. at 321).
143. See, e.g., Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 96 C 1647, 1999 WL 495126, at *6–7
(N.D. Ill. July 1, 1999) (summarizing courts’ applications of the puffery defense in falseadvertising cases).
144. “Greenwashing” can be defined as a form of mass-market advertising in which
marketing techniques are used to persuade the public that a company’s business products or
services are more environmentally friendly than is, in fact, the case. See, e.g., William S.
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2. Beyond Commercial Speech
In some ways its act of original sin with respect to corporate speech
rights, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bellotti held for the first time that
corporations have First Amendment speech protections that extend beyond
commercial speech, and that a public business corporation, like a person, is
free to express or otherwise promote opinions on social or political issues
unrelated to the company’s business.145 Procedurally, Massachusetts
enacted a criminal statute disallowing the use of corporate funds to
purchase advertising to influence the outcome of referendum elections,
unless the corporation’s business interests were directly involved. 146 That
same year, Massachusetts proposed an amendment to the state
constitution—to be voted upon in a referendum election—modifying the
state personal income tax laws. 147 Several Massachusetts companies,
including the First National Bank of Boston, sued the State, alleging that
the new criminal statute violated their constitutional right to free speech in
disallowing the expenditure of corporate funds on advertising in opposition
to the proposed modification of state income tax laws.148 The Massachusetts
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the State, concluding that the statute was
constitutionally applied; the corporate plaintiffs appealed this decision to
the Supreme Court of the United States. 149
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Massachusetts Supreme Court in a
5-to-4 majority opinion delivered by Justice Powell. 150 The Court held that
Massachusetts’ criminal statute violated corporate speech rights protected
by the First Amendment, stating that “[a] commercial advertisement is
Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 253, 255–57
(2003). Although the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has taken steps to help marketers
avoid making deceptive advertising claims related to the environmental benefits of a product
or service by providing several useful resources—including its “Guides for the Use of
Environmental Marketing Claims,” known as the “Revised Green Guides,” which is not
binding law—the FTC has declined to interpret several commonly used terms such as
“sustainable” or “natural.” See generally 16 C.F.R. § 260 (2020).
145. Referred to as “the most important Supreme Court case no one’s ever heard of,” this
Supreme Court case, unlike Citizens United, did not elicit a very strong reaction from the
media or the public. See What’s the Most Important Supreme Court Case No One’s Ever
Heard Of?, ATLANTIC, May 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/05/
the-big-question/309290/.
146. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1978).
147. See id. at 769.
148. See id. at 771.
149. See id. at 773–74.
150. See id. at 767.
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constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to the seller’s
business as because it furthers the societal interest in the ‘free flow of
commercial information.’”151 The Court stated that “[t]he inherent worth of
the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend
upon the identity of its source”152 and further asserted that the government
may not “dictat[e] the subjects about which persons may speak and the
speakers who may address a public issue,” 153 citing the Buckley principle
that the government may not “restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others.”154 Importantly, the
Court rejected the argument that the First Amendment rights of a
corporation derive purely from its ongoing business or property interests. 155
The Court asserted that its “decisions involving corporations in the business
of communication or entertainment are based not only on the role of the
First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but also on its role
in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination
of information and ideas.”156 It also cited Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
in which the Supreme Court held that whether “the advertiser’s interest [in
a commercial advertisement] is a purely economic one” does not
“disqualif[y] him from protection under the First Amendment.” 157
Importantly, stating that both individual consumers and society as a whole
may have strong interests in “the free flow of commercial information,” the
Court in that case concluded that a corporation does not lose its free speech
protections if the speech in question is unrelated to the business of the
corporation. 158
The Bellotti Court also rejected the claim that the Massachusetts criminal
statute was necessary to protect the shareholders of a public corporation,
“preventing the use of corporate resources in furtherance of views with
which some shareholders may disagree.”159 Relying on the same rationale
later set forth in Citizens United, the Court held that corporate electionrelated spending was unlikely to result in corporate expenditures motivated
151. See id. at 783 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
152. Id. at 777.
153. Id. at 784–85.
154. Id. at 790–91 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976)).
155. See id. at 784.
156. Id. at 783.
157. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976).
158. Id. at 761–62, 763–64.
159. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792–95.
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by interests other than the company’s shareholders, because shareholders
themselves control corporate spending “through the procedures of
corporate democracy.”160 Hence, as in Citizens United, the Court offered up
the myth of corporate democracy as a remedy for the agency cost problems
unavoidably created when corporate speech rights under the First
Amendment are expanded to include communications unrelated to a
company’s business practices. And like Justice Stevens in Citizens United,
Justice White in Bellotti, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, similarly acknowledged the ineffectiveness of corporate
democracy as a disciplining mechanism on managerial discretion, writing
that the government has an equally compelling First Amendment interest in
“assuring that shareholders are not compelled to support and financially
further beliefs with which they disagree.” 161 The sole purpose uniting all
shareholders of a public business corporation is to make a profit, Justice
White asserted, noting, as discussed above, that allowing a public
corporation to pursue other issues unrelated to its business interests can too
easily allow corporate managers to promote their own interests and not the
best interests of the company’s stockholders. 162
B. Defining Corporate Activism
This Article defines corporate advocacy as a combination of (1)
marketing activities and (2) corporate contributions to issue advocacy
groups, in which a public business corporation exercises its corporate
speech rights to promote social or political issues unrelated to the
company’s business. As the central thesis of this Article, this subpart
advances the claim that corporate advocacy is generally not in the best
interests of a firm’s shareholders and provides two distinct theoretical
justifications in support of this claim. 163
1. Types of Corporate Advocacy
In general, corporate advocacy assumes one of three forms: (1) massmarket advertising, (2) stand-alone public statements by corporate officers
or directors, and (3) corporate contributions to issue advocacy groups.

160. See id. at 794 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 812 (White, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 805–06 (White, J., dissenting).
163. Note that this claim applies only to corporate advocacy and not stakeholder primacy,
which, as defined here, means inexpressive expenditures related to the company’s actual
business practices (e.g., choice of production technology).
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a) Mass-Market Advertising
Companies that employ mass-market advertising to engage in corporate
advocacy often promote topical, sometimes controversial social or political
issues unrelated to the company’s business. These advertisements are not
designed simply to evoke a visceral response from the viewer, but also to
inform the viewer exactly where the corporate brand “stands” on a
particular social or political issue.164 Consider, for example, Nike’s 2018
“Dream Crazy” campaign that launched with the release of a video
highlighting narratives of diverse athletes overcoming adversity to succeed
in their respective sports.165 The video was narrated by American footballer,
Colin Kaepernick, who had gained notoriety in 2016 by refusing to stand
during the U.S. national anthem as a protest against racial injustice and
police brutality.166 Kaepernick announced his partnership with Nike on
Twitter, sharing a black-and-white photo of himself with “Believe in
something. Even if it means sacrificing everything.” centered across his
face. 167 Although the commercial itself was not overtly political, making no
mention of “taking a knee,” the mass-marketing advertising campaign was
a clear attempt by Nike to align its corporate brand with a particular social
movement.
Along similar lines, in 2019, Gillette introduced a mass-market
advertising campaign designed to increase consumer awareness of the

164. See, e.g., Robert E. McDonald et al., The Interplay Between Advertising and
Society: An Historical Analysis, J. MACROMARKETING 1, 20 (2020); RACHEL BARTON ET AL.,
ACCENTURE STRATEGY, TO AFFINITY AND BEYOND: FROM ME TO WE, THE RISE OF THE
PURPOSE-LED BRAND 1, 6 (2018), https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/Thought-Leader
ship-Assets/PDF/Accenture-CompetitiveAgility-GCPR-POV.pdf; see also Justin Racine,
Using Human Emotion as a Conduit for Connection in Branding and Advertising, 9 J.
BRAND STRATEGY 423, 423 (2021) (stating that “woke advertising” attempts to create an
emotional connection with a target audience that allows the brand to take on “human-like”
qualities in the eyes of the consumer).
165. See Simon Chadwick & Sarah Zipp, Nike, Colin Kaepernick and the Pitfalls of
‘Woke’ Corporate Branding, CONVERSATION (Sept. 14, 2018, 8:53 AM EDT), https://the
conversation.com/nike-colin-kaepernick-and-the-pitfalls-of-woke-corporate-branding102922.
166. See Vann R. Newkirk II, No Country for Colin Kaepernick, ATLANTIC (Aug. 11,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/08/no-country-for-colinkaepernick/536340/.
167. See Kevin Draper et al., Nike Returns to Familiar Strategy with Kaepernick Ad
Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/sports/nikecolin-kaepernick.html.
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#MeToo movement.168 The campaign launched with the digital release of a
short film that began by asking, “[I]s this the best a man can get?” followed
by scenes highlighting negative social male behavior including bullying,
sexism, sexual misconduct, and toxic masculinity. 169 An accompanying
voiceover encouraged men to intervene to prevent this type of behavior and
to provide a positive example for young boys, explaining, “We believe in
the best in men: To say the right thing, to act the right way,” because “the
boys watching today will be the men of tomorrow.”170 The commercial
concluded with the brand’s slogan since 1989, “The Best a Man Can Get,”
reworked to reinforce this message in becoming “The Best Men Can Be.”171
Representing a significant shift in how many companies have chosen to
market their goods or services to consumers, companies engaged in this
type of corporate advocacy focus less on the functional benefits of the
advertised good or service and more on communicating, through massmarket advertising campaigns, a specific statement of corporate values to
the firm’s stakeholders that is unrelated—or only tangentially so—to
specific aspects of the company’s business practices.
b) Stand-Alone Public Statements by Corporate Officers or Directors
While public business corporations have generally, in the past, chosen to
stay silent on social or political issues unrelated to the company’s
business, 172 public corporations understand that, today, choosing to remain
168. See Alexandra Topping et al., Gillette #MeToo Razors Ad on ‘Toxic Masculinity’
Gets Praise—And Abuse, GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2019, 4:15 PM EST), https://www.the
guardian.com/world/2019/jan/15/gillette-metoo-ad-on-toxic-masculinity-cuts-deep-withmens-rights-activists.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.; see also The Best Men Can Be, GILLETTE, https://gillette.com/en-us/ourcommittment (last visited Jan. 5, 2022) (“It’s time we acknowledge that brands, like ours,
play a role in influencing culture. And as a company that encourages men to be their best,
we have a responsibility to make sure we are promoting positive, attainable, inclusive, and
healthy versions of what it means to be a man.”).
172.
In the past, wading into activism was a surefire way to risk damaging your
business. Now, between the endless, real-time conversation taking place on
social media, and the rising tide of advocacy bubbling up from their own
employees, customers and investors, saying nothing may be just as
dangerous—if not more so.
Sam Walker, You’re a CEO—Stop Talking Like a Political Activist, WALL ST. J. (July 27,
2018, 5:30 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/youre-a-ceostop-talking-like-a-politicalactivist-1532683844.
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silent on such issues can have significant negative financial repercussions
for the company.173 To prevent this negative outcome, public corporations,
as well as corporate managers personally, have increasingly issued public
statements on a wide range of social or political issues. In 2019, for
example, more than 180 CEOs signed a letter opposing regulations
designed to restrict women’s access to reproductive healthcare, including
abortion.174 Using the headline “Don’t Ban Equality,” this letter appeared as
a full-page advertisement in The New York Times less than a month after
the signing of Alabama legislation that banned doctors from performing
abortion procedures at any stage of pregnancy. 175 Similarly, the CEOs of
fourteen major food companies cosigned an open letter calling on
government leaders to create a strong accord that would “meaningfully
address the reality of climate change.” 176 Also, in February 2021,
approximately three hundred companies signed a letter that appeared as a
full-page advertisement in The New York Times and other publications. 177
Headlined “We Stand for Democracy,” the signers committed “to defend
the right to vote and to oppose any discriminatory legislation or measures
that restrict or prevent any eligible voter from having an equal and fair
opportunity to cast a ballot.”178 Although the letter did not reference new
voting legislation—either in Georgia or in any other state—or mention any
173. A 2016 study by the Public Affairs Council, for example, reported that “[m]ore than
three-quarters of [the companies studied] said they experienced increased pressure to weigh
in on social issues.” Doug Pinkham, Why Companies Are Getting More Engaged on Social
Issues, PUB. AFFS. COUNCIL (Aug. 30, 2016), https://pac.org/blog/why-companies-aregetting-more-engaged-on-social-issues; see also Jessica Vredenburg et al., Brands Taking a
Stand: Authentic Brand Activism or Woke Washing, 39 J. PUB. POL’Y & M KTG. 444, 450
(2020) (suggesting that brand activism is becoming increasingly demanded).
174. See Courtney Connley, Jack Dorsey, Emily Weiss and 185 Other CEOs Sign Letter
Calling Abortion Bans ‘Bad for Business,’ CNBC (June 10, 2019, 1:27 PM EDT),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/09/nearly-200-ceos-sign-letter-calling-abortion-bans-badfor-business.html.
175. See id. “The letter that appears today in The Times was spearheaded by the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Planned Parenthood Federation of America,
NARAL Pro-Choice America and the Center for Reproductive Rights.” Id.
176. Aaron K. Chatterji & Michael W. Toffel, The New CEO Activists, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jan.–Feb. 2018, at 78, 82. “Similarly, nearly 100 CEOs cosigned an amicus brief to
encourage federal judges to overturn Trump’s executive order banning citizens from seven
Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States.” Id.
177. See Ian Carlos Campbell, Amazon, Apple, Google, and Facebook Sign Public Letter
Supporting Voting Rights, VERGE (Apr. 14, 2021, 5:11 PM EDT), https://www.theverge.
com/2021/4/14/22384060/amazon-apple-google-facebook-public-letter-voting-rights.
178. Id.
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other action under consideration, The New York Times still chose to
explicitly identify certain CEOs “who didn’t sign a big defense of voting
rights.”179
With the rise of social media, public companies can now more easily
disseminate these types of public statements on social or political issues. 180
Following the horrific killing of George Floyd, for example, Netflix
tweeted: “To be silent is to be complicit. Black lives matter.” 181 Six hours
later, Hulu, a subsidiary of Disney, tweeted: “We support Black lives.
Today, and every day.”182 Reebok posted a similar statement: “Without the
black community, Reebok would not exist. America would not exist.” 183
Even PAW Patrol, an animated television show for children, posted a
solidarity message, choosing to mute its content so that other voices may be
heard.184 Although not overtly political, the language in these social media
communications is designed to indicate solidarity towards the Black Lives
Matter social movement.185 Other public corporations, however, have used
social media to engage in much more explicitly political corporate speech.
Expressing its support for the “Defund the Police” movement, for example,
ice-cream maker Ben & Jerry’s, a subsidiary of parent company Unilever,
posted on Twitter: “The murder of #DaunteWright is rooted in white
supremacy and results from the intentional criminalization of Black and
Brown communities. This system can’t be reformed. It must be dismantled,
and a real system of public safety rebuilt from the ground up.”186 Similarly,
179. See Andrew Ross Sorkin et al., The C.E.O.s Who Didn’t Sign a Big Defense of
Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/14/business/
dealbook/ceos-voting-rights.html.
180. See generally Don E. Schultz & James W. Peltier, Social Media’s Slippery Slope:
Challenges, Opportunities and Future Research Directions, 7 J. RSCH. INTERACTIVE MKTG.
86 (2013).
181. Netflix (@netflix), TWITTER (May 30, 2020, 3:30 PM), https://twitter.com/netflix/
status/1266829242353893376.
182. Hulu (@hulu), TWITTER (May 30, 2020, 9:05 PM), https://twitter.com/hulu/status/
1266913549512658946.
183. Reebok (@Reebok), TWITTER (May 30, 2020, 1:04 PM), https://twitter.com/
Reebok/status/1266792697941164032.
184. PAW Patrol (@pawpatrol), TWITTER (Jun. 2, 2020, 8:21 AM), https://twitter.com/
pawpatrol/status/1267808607694917633.
185. See Nick Martin, The Brands Don’t Care About George Floyd’s Death, NEW
REPUBLIC (Jun. 3, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/157977/corporate-brands-dontcare-george-floyds-death.
186. Ben & Jerry’s (@benandjerrys), TWITTER (April 12, 2021, 6:00 PM) (emphasis
added), https://twitter.com/benandjerrys/status/1381743962558504969?lang=en. Some have
argued that “these brave, ice-cream-slinging warriors for racial justice seem to be putting
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Seventh Generation, an American company that sells natural household
cleaning products, posted this message on Twitter: “We support defunding
the police like we support keeping fossil fuels in the ground. It’s imperative
we divest from systems of harm and invest in regenerative systems for
all.”187
In addition, like the corporate entity itself, CEOs and other corporate
managers have also used social media platforms, such as Twitter or
Instagram, to publicly communicate a personal stance on social or political
issues unrelated to the company’s business. 188 Evan Greenberg, the CEO of
Chubb, a Zurich-based insurance company, publicly stated in connection
with the 2017 travel ban from certain countries: “We are a country of
immigrants. Our country’s openness to immigration is fundamental to our
identity and history as a nation, and vital to our future prosperity. I am 100
percent for the security of our citizens.”189 Greenberg added, “But at the
same time, America is the land of the free, and we are a beacon and place of
refuge that those seeking a better and safer life to themselves and their
families. Shutting our doors to immigration is a mistake.” 190 Likewise, Joe
Kiani, the CEO of Masimo, a global publicly traded medical technology
company, tweeted in response to a national student-led demonstration in
support of gun control legislation: “I stand with @AMarch4OurLives & the
students leading the way to gun reform! Join the march! Our schools and
our children must be safe!”191
c) Contributions to Issue Advocacy Groups
Finally, a public business corporation, as part of its corporate advocacy,
can make contributions to specific issue advocacy groups. Again, following
the death of George Floyd, many companies announced contributions to
themselves at odds with much of the black community.” Tom Slater, Why Do Ben & Jerry’s
Want to Defund the Police?, SPECTATOR (Apr. 15, 2021, 9:27 AM), https://www.spectator.
co.uk/article/why-does-ben-jerry-s-want-to-defund-the-police- (“According to Gallup, while
black Americans of course want better policing, 81 per cent still want police to spend the
same amount of time or more time in their area.”).
187. Seventh Generation (@SeventhGen), TWITTER (April 19, 2021, 8:42 AM) (emphasis
added), https://twitter.com/seventhgen/status/1384140247345205253?lang=en.
188. See generally David F. Larcker et al., The Double-Edged Sword of CEO Activism,
STAN. UNIV. CLOSER LOOK SERIES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/
default/files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-74-double-edged-sword-ceo-activism.pdf.
189. Id. at 3.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 4; see also Joe Kiani (@JoeKiani), TWITTER (Mar. 24, 2018, 12:09 PM),
https://twitter.com/JoeKiani/status/977593163224440832.
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charitable organizations that advocate in support of greater racial justice
and equality. Verizon, for example, “committed $10 million to be shared
equally between The National Urban League, NAACP, National Action
Network, Leadership Conference for Civil and Human Rights, Rainbow
Push Coalition, National Coalition on Black Civic Participation, and
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.” 192 With recipients selected
from Amazon’s Black Employee Network, Amazon committed to donate a
total of $10 million to recipients including “the ACLU Foundation,
Brennan Center for Justice, Equal Justice Initiative, Lawyers’ Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, NAACP, National Bar Association, National
Museum of African American History and Culture, National Urban League,
Thurgood Marshall College Fund, UNCF (United Negro College Fund),
and Year Up.”193 The Coca-Cola Foundation committed $2.5 million in
grants to The Equal Justice Initiative, NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, and National Center for Civil and Human Rights. 194
Likewise, Zynga announced $1 million in donations to the ACLU
Foundation, NAACP, Thurgood Marshall College Fund, Northside
Achievement Zone, and Race Forward. 195
2. Maximizing Corporate Profits
This Article has defined corporate advocacy as a combination of
marketing activities and corporate contributions to issue advocacy groups.
To place these expressive expenditures on corporate social responsibility
within the typography set forth in Table 1, this spending on corporate
speech must be categorized according to whether this spending on corporate
speech maximizes corporate profits. This Article advances the claim that
corporate advocacy is generally not in the best interests of the company’s
stockholders and refers to such spending on corporate social responsibility
as “corporate activism.”

192. See David Hessekiel, Companies Taking a Public Stand in the Wake of George
Floyd’s Death, FORBES (Jun. 4, 2020, 11:24 AM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
davidhessekiel/2020/06/04/companies-taking-a-public-stand-in-the-wake-of-george-floydsdeath/?sh=90539d172148.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Frank Gibeau, My Thoughts; Zynga’s Call to Action, ZYNGA (June 5, 2020),
https://www.zynga.com/corporate/my-thoughts-zyngas-call-to-action/. On a smaller scale,
Biossance, a skincare company, has pledged $100,000 in donations to the ACLU
Foundation, Minnesota Freedom Fund, Color of Change, and Black Lives Matter. See
Hessekiel, supra note 192.
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a) Profit Maximizing
The impact of corporate advocacy on corporate profits is, of course,
ultimately an empirical question, and certainly some corporate advocacy
may not constitute corporate activism insofar as these expressive
expenditures on corporate social responsibility maximize shareholder value.
In this case, corporate advocacy can be classified, according to the
typography in Table 1, as a mix of cause promotion and cause-related
contributions.196 This Article contends that most corporate advocacy is
better classified as corporate activism. The argument to the contrary,
however, contends that management engages in corporate advocacy to align
the corporate brand with particular social or political issues unrelated to the
company’s business that management believes will, nevertheless, resonate
with specific corporate stakeholders, such as customers or investors, to the
financial benefit of the firm’s shareholders. 197 Under this view, corporate
advocacy is merely another form of corporate brand management: a profit
maximization business strategy, like cause-promotion marketing or causerelated contributions, in which a company spends money on corporate
social responsibility to advance the best interests of its existing
stockholders.
Proponents of corporate advocacy cite to survey results indicating that
corporate stakeholders increasingly expect companies to take a public
stance on social or political issues unrelated to the company’s business and
are willing to forego financial benefits (e.g., higher wage, lower prices,
higher return on investment) to transact with firms that “hold” values or
beliefs in close lockstep to their own. 198 The demographic group most likely
to exhibit such socially conscious preferences are Millennials, who have
overtaken Baby Boomers to become the United States’ largest living adult
generation. 199 A 2017 survey, for example, found that 47% of Millennials
196. See supra Table 1.
197. See, e.g., Michelle Andrews et al., Cause Marketing Effectiveness and the
Moderating Role of Price Discounts, 78 J. MARKETING 120, 121 (2014) (reporting study
results suggesting that cause marketing “can significantly increase consumer purchases”).
198. See generally EDELMAN, 2019 EDELMAN TRUST BAROMETER SPECIAL REPORT : IN
BRANDS WE TRUST ? 2 (2020), https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/201906/2019_edelman_trust_barometer_special_report_in_brands_we_trust.pdf (finding that
64% of consumers were “belief-driven buyers,” meaning such consumers may choose to
purchase, switch from or to, or boycott, a brand based upon its public stance on social or
political issues).
199. See Richard Fry, Millennials Overtake Baby Boomers as America’s Largest
Generation, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/
04/28/millennials-overtake-baby-boomers-as-americas-largest-generation/.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss3/2

2022]

AGAINST CORPORATE ACTIVISM

289

“believe CEOs have a responsibility to speak up about issues that are
important to society.”200 In this same survey, 56% of Millennials agreed
that “CEOs and other business leaders have greater responsibility today for
speaking out on hotly debated current issues than they used to.”201 In view
of these stated preferences, proponents of corporate advocacy thus
rationalize a public corporation’s decision to engage in corporate advocacy
as a customer-retention or employee-bonding strategy designed to harness
and amplify, and ultimately monetize, the changing preferences of those
stakeholders who matter most in terms of corporate profits—and who
increasingly disproportionately fall on one side of the culture war.202
b) Profit Sacrificing
Although a positive view of corporate advocacy may have merit in
certain limited cases, this Article argues that corporate advocacy is
generally not in the best interests of a firm’s shareholders. This subpart
provides two distinct theoretical justifications for why spending on
corporate advocacy is unlikely to maximize corporate profits: (1) agency
costs and (2) free speech as pure conflict.
(1) Agency Costs
To start, corporate advocacy suffers from the same fundamental agency
costs that afflict all expenditures on corporate social responsibility. This
Article contends that these agency costs are particularly acute in the case of
expressive expenditures on corporate social responsibility, as compared to
inexpressive expenditures, for two reasons. First, the cost to a corporate
manager of engaging in corporate speech is significantly lower than the cost
incurred by a manager in implementing a firm-wide change to a firm’s
existing business practices. For example, a manager can much more easily
make a public announcement or direct a contribution to a specific charitable
organization than compel the company to adopt a new production
technology or change its corporate culture. To this point, an important
critique of corporate advocacy argues that companies prefer to
communicate token responses to systemic problems rather than do the hard
200. WEBER SHANDWICK & KRC RESEARCH, CEO ACTIVISM IN 2017: HIGH NOON IN THE
C-SUITE 5 (2017), https://www.webershandwick.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ceoactivism-in-2017-high-noon-in-the-c-suite.pdf .
201. Id.
202. See Josh Barro, There’s a Simple Reason Companies Are Becoming More Publicly
Left-Wing on Social Issues, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 1, 2018, 7:53 AM), https://www.business
insider.com/why-companies-ditching-nra-delta-selling-guns-2018-2.
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work of implementing a material change to the company’s existing business
practices.203
Second, the benefit to a corporate manager of engaging in corporate
speech is likely to be higher than the benefit enjoyed in implementing a
firm-wide change to the company’s existing business practices. While a
manager may certainly enjoy the private satisfaction of knowing that the
company’s business practices satisfy or fulfill some personal ideological
agenda, this benefit is likely to be an increasing function of public
knowledge or awareness; the manager receives a greater benefit the more
people know or are aware of her support for a given social or political
issue.204 Almost by definition, corporate speech reaches a larger audience
than do changes to a company’s business practices, which are often highly
technical and have social impact implications that can be fully understood
by only a small number of experts. Motivated by reputational concerns, a
corporate manager may prefer to communicate to a large audience of likeminded individuals, without any additional action by the company, a
personal commitment to, say, environmental sustainability or racial justice,
rather than to silently run the company in a more environmentally
sustainable or racially equitable manner. The latter option would reap only
the quiet satisfaction of knowing that the company has sacrificed profits to
make other corporate stakeholders better off.
More specifically, in the standard critique of corporate advocacy,
management is described as progressive, highly educated, urban, coastal,
wealthy elites who engage in “faculty lounge” politics in publicly
communicating support for social or political issues that do not represent
the views of a vast majority of their shareholders.205 As Professor
Bainbridge argues, corporate advocacy often reflects the more inherently
liberal values of corporate officers whose “values, beliefs, and tastes . . .
have radically diverged from those of red state populists. In many cases, it
simply would not occur to SJWs [social justice warriors] like [former Nike
CEO Phil] Knight that there are folks who would take offense from the

203. See generally infra notes 217–218 and accompanying text.
204. See generally Andreoni, supra note 66, at 464–65.
205. See generally Sean Illing, “Wokeness Is a Problem and We All Know It”: James
Carville on the State of Democratic Politics, VOX (Apr. 27, 2021, 8:30 AM EDT),
https://www.vox.com/22338417/james-carville-democratic-party-biden-100-days (quoting
Carville’s description of “faculty lounge” politics as a form of signaling based on the use of
elevated language).
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Kaepernick ad.”206 Of course, this agency cost problem is not confined to
corporate managers whose ideological views lie to the left of the median
voter. David Green, for example, the founder and CEO of Hobby Lobby—a
closely held corporation—publicly cited his religious beliefs in justifying
his opposition to the Obamacare requirement that health insurance for
employees include coverage for the morning-after pill,207 a personal belief
that lies to the right of the median voter. 208
This agency cost argument against corporate advocacy assumes, of
course, that management and the stockholders of a corporation have
differing personal beliefs or convictions. Such an ideological disconnect
may have been unlikely a generation ago when “the class of Americans
who were invested in the stock market was likely to be far more affluent
than the average person,” and “ordinary American workers were typically
not considered part of the investing class” because they were not likely to
be invested in the stock market.209 Today, however, most workers save for
retirement in a defined-contribution 401(k) plan, meaning that the
beneficial owners of publicly traded companies are much more likely to
comprise a representative cross-section of America, holding widely
divergent views across a range of social and political issues. 210 With
approximately 80% of the shares of public corporations in the hands of
206. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Woke Business: Putting the Nike-Kaepernick Ad
Controversy into Context: The Problem of Social Justice Warrior CEOs,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/pro
fessorbainbridgecom/2018/09/woke-business-putting-the-nike-kaepernick-ad-controversyinto-context-the-problemof-social-justice-.html; cf. Ann Lipton, The Revolution Will Be
Marketed, BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (Sept. 8, 2018), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_
1aw/2018/09/the-revolution-will-be-marketed.html (finding it “difficult to believe that
Knight was unaware this is a controversial move; it seems designed to be controversial”
(emphases omitted)).
207. See Chatterji & Toffel, supra note 176, at 81. See generally Ryan M. Hrobak &
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Emergency Contraceptives or “Abortion-Inducing” Drugs?
Empowering Women to Make Informed Decisions, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1385 (2014).
208. See Scott Hensley, Poll: Americans Favor Age Restrictions on Morning-After Pill,
NPR (Dec. 19, 2013, 5:07 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/10/16/
235384057/americans-favor-age-restrictions-on-morning-after-pill (“[M]ost Americans
believe insurers should pay for the morning-after pill.”).
209. Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension
Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV.
335, 368 (2015).
210. See Robert M. Ackerman & Lance Cole, Making Corporate Law More
Communitarian: A Proposed Response to the Roberts Court’s Personification of
Corporations, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 895, 945 (2016).
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large institutional investors,211 such as pension funds or mutual funds, the
typical owner of a public company today is less likely to be progressive in
the manner of a Phil Knight or Marc Benioff or conservative in the manner
of a David Green. Instead, the typical owner is more likely to be moderate
in the manner of an ordinary American who has invested in the stock
market to save for retirement or for her child’s education and is not
particularly interested in having her capital investment fund be aligned with
specific corporate advocacy efforts that she would not otherwise
individually support if asked to do so directly.
Arguably, the existence of an agency cost problem is evidenced by the
lack of empirical evidence showing that corporate advocacy is profitable in
the long run; the impact of such expenditures on corporate social
responsibility on shareholder value remains essentially unknown. 212
Researchers have found, for example, that CEO advocacy “can shape public
opinion and purchasing intent,” but only if some alignment exists between
the CEO’s message and individuals’ policy preferences.213 A study in 2016
similarly found that consumers positively viewed corporate advocacy in
companies that were considered “values-oriented” but negatively viewed
companies that failed to align with particular values; the study posited that
the impact of corporate advocacy on consumers’ purchasing behavior is
largely driven “by the degree of ‘perceived corporate hypocrisy.’” 214 These
empirical findings suggest that even if corporate advocacy is profitable in
the short run, such expressive expenditures on corporate social
responsibility are unlikely to be profitable in the long run, unless the
company invests costly corporate resources in building up its perceived
211. See Lund, supra note 105, at 498–99.
212. It is unclear whether corporate social responsibility causes better financial
performance or vice versa, or even whether causation simultaneously runs in both directions.
See, e.g., Marc Orlitzky et al., Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Metaanalysis, 24 ORG. STUD. 403, 406 (2003) (“There is bidirectional causality between
corporate social performance and financial performance.”); Jordi Surroca et al., Corporate
Responsibility and Financial Performance: The Role of Intangible Resources, 31 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 463, 465–66 (2010) (discussing research that suggests corporate social
responsibility “is both a predictor and a consequence of” financial performance).
213. Aaron K. Chatterji & Michael W. Toffel, Assessing the Impact of CEO Activism, 32
ORG. & ENV’T 159, 160, 178 (2019) (“CEO activism risks alienating consumers who
disagree with the CEO’s public stance.”).
214. See Larcker et al., supra note 188, at 1 (quoting Daniel Korschun et al., Taking a
Stand: Consumer Responses When Companies Get (Or Don’t Get) Political 18–19 (July 3,
2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=280
6476).
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authenticity with key corporate stakeholders. This means closely aligning
its existing business practices with the messaging of its corporate advocacy.
Communications that do not accurately depict the company’s actual
business practices expose the company to credible accusations that the
company is “all talk” and run the risk of antagonizing various corporate
stakeholders, including customers or investors, who may come to perceive
the company’s cause-marketing campaign as a deliberate misdirection
intended to convey a false or misleading impression of the firm’s actual
business practices.215 As Robert F. Smith recently noted regarding corporate
America’s response to the death of George Floyd, “Corporate America can
no longer get away with token responses to systemic problems.” 216
Pepsi’s famously calamitous 2017 “Live for Now” commercial serves as
a powerful cautionary tale in this regard. The commercial featured an
angry, diverse crowd of mostly Millennials at what appears to be a Black
Lives Matter protest marching to a standoff with the police, until realitytelevision star Kendall Jenner singlehandedly defuses the tension by
offering a police officer a single can of Pepsi. 217 Many considered this
commercial to be disingenuous and insensitive, a transparent attempt by a
corporate brand to capitalize on, or monetize in some way, racial injustice
and police brutality. In response to a barrage of negative responses,
PepsiCo pulled the commercial from circulation. 218 The immediately
215. See, e.g., Jessica Vredenburg et al., Woke Washing: What Happens When Marketing
Communications Don’t Match Corporate Practice, CONVERSATION (Dec. 5, 2018, 8:14 PM
AEDT), https://openrepository.aut.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10292/12164/Woke%20washing_
%20what%20happens%20when%20marketing%20communications%20don't%20match%20
corporate%20practice.pdf?sequence=2; see also Mark R. Forehand & Sonya Grier, When Is
Honesty the Best Policy? The Effect of Stated Company Intent on Consumer Skepticism, 13
J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 349, 354–55 (2003) (confirming that consumers’ attribution of a
firm’s business practices to firm-serving motivations lowered the consumers’ evaluation of
the firm only when those firm-serving attributions were inconsistent with the motive
expressed by the firm).
216. See, e.g., David Gelles, ‘Corporate America Has Failed Black America,’ N.Y.
TIMES (June 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/business/corporate-americahas-failed-black-america.html.
217. See, e.g., Daniel Victor, Pepsi Pulls Ad Accused of Trivializing Black Lives Matter,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/business/kendall-jennerpepsi-ad.html.
218. See id.; Sandra Gonzalez, Kendall Jenner’s Pepsi Ad Sparks Backlash, CNN BUS.
(Apr. 5, 2017, 6:27 AM ET), https://money.cnn.com/2017/04/04/media/kendall-jennerpepsi-ad/index.html. The Gillette advertisement discussed in Section IV.B.1.a provoked a
similarly negative response. See Josh Barro, Why Nike’s Woke Ad Campaign Works and
Gillette’s Doesn’t, INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 15, 2019), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/01/
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unfavorable reaction to this commercial strongly suggests that the success
of corporate advocacy critically depends upon how consumers perceive the
authenticity of the corporation’s positioning on a given social or political
issue. Further, the overwhelmingly negative reaction also dramatically
demonstrates the extent to which management and other corporate
stakeholders, including the firm’s stockholders, can have widely divergent
views on how a company can best exercise its corporate speech rights to
promote social or political issues unrelated to the company’s business.
(2) Speech as Pure Conflict
In addition to agency costs, this Article contends that corporate activism
is also the product of socially suboptimal conflict created when public
business corporations are granted greater speech rights. With an increased
capacity to speak, a public business corporation is compelled to engage in a
costly ideological conflict at the expense of its shareholders. To make this
more concrete, corporate speech is modeled below, in a simplification of
reality, as a static game in which two players contest an indivisible
resource. 219 Each player chooses one of two actions: (1) speak or (2) stay
silent. If both players choose to speak, then they engage in a costly
ideological conflict that neither wins. If only one player chooses to speak,
however, with the other choosing to stay silent, then the player who has
chosen to speak wins, defeating the other player who has chosen not to
participate in the ideological conflict. If both players choose to stay silent,
then neither player engages in costly conflict and the issue remains equally
likely to be true.
Formally, the payoff matrix for this simple static two-player game of
speech as pure conflict is represented in Figure 1.

why-nikes-woke-ad-campaign-works-and-gillettes-doesnt.html (arguing that stakeholders
were bound to ask why a public company such as Gillette should have any authority to
lecture them on masculinity and what Gillette actually contributed to the #MeToo movement
or what efforts Gillette had undertaken to empower women other than changing its corporate
slogan).
219. See W.C. Bunting, Resolving Conflicts Over Scarce Resources: Private Versus
Shared Ownership, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 893, 904–05 (2016) (applying a similar model of
conflict—the “Hawk-Dove game”—to shared ownership).
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Figure 1. Speech as Pure Conflict
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Let ν > 0 denote the value of the contested scarce resource, and c > 0 denote
the cost of conflict.220
Specifically, ν represents acceptance of a social or political viewpoint,
where acceptance means that the ideological position (e.g., the right to an
attorney in a criminal trial) has binding impact in society through a judicial
opinion or a legislative statute, or more abstractly perhaps, as the result of a
prevailing social norm. Likewise, c represents the cost of ideological
conflict: it is the cost of engaging in a war of ideas through the exercise of
corporate speech rights. A key feature of this conflict game is that the
socially optimal outcome in which both players choose to stay silent does
not obtain as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. 221 In this
representation of speech as pure conflict, the right to speak leaves both
parties worse-off compared to the state of the world in which neither has
such speech rights.222 That is, both parties would prefer to stay silent, but
220. If 0 < c ≤ ν, then Figure 1 represents the traditional matrix for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. If c > ν > 0, then Figure 1 represents the traditional payoff matrix for the
Hawk-Dove game. See generally J. Maynard Smith & G. R. Price, The Logic of Animal
Conflict, 246 NATURE 15, 15–16 (1973).
221. See David Sally, Game Theory: Game Theory Behaves, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 783, 783
(2004) (“The Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies in a two-player game that are the best
possible responses to each other.”); see generally JOHN M AYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND
THE THEORY OF GAMES (1982).
222. See generally Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86
VA. L. REV. 1649, 1654–55 (2000). For the Hawk-Dove game, assume that the mixed
strategy equilibrium is more plausible and ignore the two pure strategy equilibria in which
one player chooses to speak and the other player chooses to stay silent. Let p denote the
probability that a player chooses to speak. It is relatively straightforward to show that p =
𝜈/c in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (i.e., this equation is derived by equating the
expected payoff of choosing to speak and the expected payoff of choosing to remain silent).
Notice that as the value of winning the ideological conflict, ν, increases relative to the cost of
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the strategic incentives of the game preclude each from taking this socially
optimal action; instead, both players speak, engaging in a mutually
disadvantageous ideological conflict.223
In the case of a public business corporation, granting this business
organization speech rights that protect communications beyond commercial
speech—treating it as a person who can express opinions or beliefs with
respect to complex social or political issues unrelated to its actual business
practices—in effect transforms the public business corporation into a player
in this mutually disadvantageous speech game. Once the public corporation
possesses the legal capacity to speak on issues unrelated to the manufacture
of toothpaste, for instance, the corporation is now compelled to weigh in on
social or political issues and will have no reasonable basis for refusing to
respond. 224 As Professor Lin states, “Because the law has given
corporations such great freedom and deference to engage in issues of social,
political, and religious significance, it is only natural that advocates for
such issues try to leverage the resources and reach of corporate interests.” 225
Just as Super PACs are a foreseeable result of the holding in Citizens
United, corporate activism, in many ways, is the entirely predictable result
of Bellotti; with speech rights comes not only the ability to speak, but the
public expectation to speak as well.
Why do public business corporations not heed the “so-called Michael
Jordan dictum that Republicans buy sneakers too” and choose to stay silent
on divisive social or political issues that can hurt sales?226 Why not speak
only on what traditionally has been perceived as core business issues, such
as taxes or trade? Why weigh in on social or political issues that are likely
to antagonize certain stakeholders of the firm? Assuming the company
conflict, c, the probability that a player chooses to speak, p, approaches one. If ν = c, then the
Hawk-Dove game transforms into the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which both
parties choose to speak, and suboptimal conflict obtains with probability one.
223. See id. If one player chooses to stay silent, then she concedes the outcome of the
fight to the other player; thus, the other player can convince others in society, without any
resistance or pushback, to accept her opposing ideological viewpoint.
224. See Harvey Golub, Politics Is Risky Business for CEOs, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12, 2021
6:19 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/politics-is-risky-business-for-ceos-11618265960
(“There is no limiting principle to this problem. If business heads can be pressured to
comment on issues unrelated to their businesses, they will be compelled to weigh in on more
current events and issues and will have no basis for refusing to respond. What do you think
of catch and release at the border, what do you think of no-bail laws in New York? It will go
on and on.”).
225. Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1573 (2018).
226. See Chatterji & Toffel, supra note 176, at 81.
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chooses to stay silent, refusing to take a public stance on a social or
political issue, the claim is that the company concedes the fight to other
corporate stakeholders—for example, a small group of vocal employees or
a handful of investors with outsized influence. These corporate stakeholders
can reshape the corporate silence into an implicit affirmation of an
opposing ideological viewpoint. To prevent harmful mischaracterizations of
its ideological viewpoint, the corporation speaks out—but it does not
accomplish much else in choosing to engage in this costly war of ideas. The
shareholders of the company would prefer not to engage in ideological
conflict in which costly corporate resources are expended on speech that
achieves very little, if anything at all. 227 But shareholders also understand
that this ideological conflict is unavoidable if a public business corporation
is to be legally conceived of as a person who can, like all individuals, be
asked to take a public position on a broad set of social or political issues. 228
Under this view, corporate managers, as players in this free speech game,
expend costly resources on otherwise unprofitable corporate activism, not
to promote some private ideological agenda, but to avert harm to the
corporation inflicted by external actors.229 Compared to the agency cost
model discussed throughout, these expenditures on corporate social
responsibility are much more defensive in nature. The company chooses to
speak not because the company believes that these expressive expenditures
will, in fact, make a difference in society, but because the company
understands that if it chooses to remain silent, the company will suffer
financial losses in allowing others to distort or otherwise misrepresent its
“corporate ideology.” The objective is not to maximize gains, but rather to
minimize losses, with the company exercising its corporate speech rights
more to appease certain special interest groups with outsized influence than
to push forward a specific ideological agenda to the betterment of
227. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 131 (“Most publicly traded corporations do
not want to be associated with controversial positions on hot-button social issues that
dominate elections, notably abortion, capital punishment, foreign military engagements, and
school prayer.”).
228. See Michael Neureiter & C.B. Bhattacharya, Why Do Boycotts Sometimes Increase
Sales? Consumer Activism in the Age of Political Polarization, 64 BUS. HORIZONS 611, 619
(2021).
229. See, e.g., Ross Douthat, Opinion, The Rise of Woke Capital, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/opinion/corporate-america-activism.html
(defining “woke capital” as “a certain kind of virtue-signaling on progressive social causes, a
certain degree of performative wokeness . . . offered to liberalism and the activist left preemptively, in the hopes that having corporate America take their side in the culture wars will
blunt efforts to tax or regulate our new monopolies too heavily”) .
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society.230 In this way—and this is the key point—a public business
corporation is made better off when the possibility of corporate advocacy is
removed: less corporate speech rights benefits a public business corporation
in precluding a costly ideological conflict that does not advance the best
interests of the firm’s stockholders.
C. Public Policy Proposal
To reduce the frequency with which public business corporations engage
in unprofitable corporate activism, this Article suggests, as a tentative
public policy proposal, that the SEC should encourage public companies
that trade on stock exchanges in the United States to establish a
“communications committee,” chartered by the company’s board of
directors, responsible for the oversight of all forms of corporate speech by
the corporation. The primary responsibility of this proposed committee is to
ensure that the company’s spending on corporate speech promotes the best
interests of its shareholders, and not the interests of other corporate
stakeholders, including management or certain special interest groups with
outsized influence.
1. Unified Treatment of Corporate Speech
In most public business corporations, the oversight of expressive
expenditures on corporate social responsibility tends to be dispersed among
several distinct corporate divisions or departments. A government affairs
division, for example, may oversee expenditures on express advocacy and
political contributions. A dedicated community relations department may
supervise and manage all charitable contributions; in some cases, the
company may have set up a separately administered private non-profit
foundation to manage charitable contributions. Several different
departments may oversee issue advocacy, with the marketing department,
for instance, responsible for brand management and the communications
department in charge of vetting all public statements by the company or
members of its management team. This Article argues for a more unified
treatment of all corporate speech, meaning specifically that a single
committee comprised of a subset of a firm’s board of directors carefully
assess all expressive expenditures on corporate social responsibility to
determine whether this spending on corporate speech is consistent with the
company’s current business practices and, more importantly, whether this
230. See generally STEPHEN R. SOUKUP, THE DICTATORSHIP
POLITICAL CORRECTNESS CAPTURED BIG BUSINESS (2021).
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spending on corporate speech promotes the best interests of the firm’s
shareholders in a particularized and relatively verifiable manner.
As Table 1 highlights, corporate social responsibility often requires a
public business corporation to engage in some form of corporate speech, be
it directly, through marketing activities, or indirectly, through corporate
contributions to philanthropic organizations, in which the corporation
spends money to promote specific social or political issues. No matter the
form, these expressive expenditures on corporate social responsibility all
implicate the same basic agency cost problem: spending on corporate
speech is motivated by interests other than the company’s shareholders.
This similarity across the different types of expressive expenditures on
corporate social responsibility is often lost, however, in the current social
and political discourse. Consider issue advocacy and political contributions,
for example. As discussed, corporate managers can use both forms of
corporate speech to promote social or political issues unrelated to the
company’s business at the expense of corporate profits.231 Yet despite this
same fundamental shortcoming, these two types of expressive expenditures
tend to be viewed entirely differently. In the case of political contributions,
the political left, for instance, views Citizens United—which expanded
corporate speech rights to include “independent expenditures”—in a
markedly negative light, with Democratic politicians describing the
decision as “devastating to the public interest,”232 a “terrible decision [that]
deserves as robust a response as soon as possible,” 233 “a stunning act of
judicial activism—the kind of reaching-beyond-the-law action political
conservatives have been complaining about,” 234 and “the worst Supreme
Court decision since the Dred Scott case.” 235 In the case of issue advocacy,
on the other hand, the political left criticizes public corporations for not
taking a more active public stance on specific social or political issues
231. See supra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2.
232. See Darlene Superville, Obama Weekly Address Video: President Blasts Supreme
Court over Citizens United Decision, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/obama-weekly-address-vide_n_434082.
233. See Susan Crabtree, Sen. Kerry Backs Changing Constitution to Deal with Supreme
Court Decision, THE HILL (Feb. 2, 2010, 8:00 PM EST), https://thehill.com/homenews/
senate/79289-kerry-backs-changing-constitution-to-deal-with-scotus-decision.
234. See John F. Kerry, Undoing SCOTUS-Decision Damage, POLITICO (Feb. 16,
2010, 5:16 AM EST), https://www.politico.com/story/2010/02/undoing-scotus-decisiondamage-032988.
235. Nick Baumann, Grayson: Court’s Campaign Finance Decision “Worst Since Dred
Scott,” MOTHER J ONES (Jan. 22, 2010), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/01/
grayson-courts-campaign-finance-decision-worst-dredd-scott/.
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unrelated to the company’s business and for not exercising its corporate
speech rights under Bellotti to advocate in support of specific ideological
issues, such as police brutality, abortion, or voting rights, in precisely the
same way that a public business corporation is empowered under Citizens
United to exercise its corporate speech rights to advocate in support of
clearly identified electoral candidates. 236
Table 1 underscores this inherent inconsistency. As discussed, an
important objection to the decision in Citizens United is that the
disciplining mechanisms upon which the Court relies to protect the
stockholders of a public business corporation (e.g., free market forces,
mandated disclosure, corporate democracy) are, in large part, insufficient as
a check upon managerial discretion.237 As Justice Stevens rightly notes in
his dissent, management can too easily use corporate resources to advance
political issues with which the firm’s shareholders may disagree. 238 But the
same objection is made by critics of corporate advocacy who argue, for
example, that “woke” corporations communicate support for progressive
causes, often through mass-market advertising campaigns, that reflect the
liberal ideology of their corporate managers, and not the more varied
ideological views of their corporate stockholders. Both types of expressive
expenditures can result in a “kind of coerced speech.”239 In this way, the
argument for not allowing managers to use corporate funds to engage in
political activity (i.e., against Citizens United) is the same argument for not
allowing managers to use corporate funds to promote social or political
issues unrelated to the company’s business (i.e., against corporate
advocacy). In other words, an unfavorable view of Citizens United is
inconsistent with a favorable view of corporate advocacy, or “woke
capitalism” as it is sometimes termed in this context. 240 And, likewise, a
favorable view of Citizens United is inconsistent with an unfavorable view
236. See Sorkin et al., supra note 179. See generally Bill Bostock, Obama Laid into
Young People Being ‘Politically Woke’ and ‘as Judgmental as Possible’ in a Speech About
Call-Out Culture, INSIDER (Oct. 30, 2019, 7:09 AM), https://www.businessinsider.
com/barack-obama-slams-call-out-culture-young-not-activism-2019-10 (“I do get a sense
sometimes now among certain young people, and this is accelerated by social media, that the
way of me making change is to be as judgmental as possible about other people and that’s
enough.”).
237. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
238. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 475 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“Those shareholders who disagree with the corporation's electoral message may find their
financial investments being used to undermine their political convictions.”).
239. See id. at 476.
240. See Douthat, supra note 229.
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of corporate advocacy. Yet, arguably, the two major political parties in the
United States, Democrats and Republicans, each hold one of these two
incoherent positions, respectively.
Recognizing that all expressive expenditures on corporate social
responsibility implicate the same basic agency cost problem, one might
nonetheless argue that a meaningful distinction can still be drawn based
upon the magnitude of that problem, with spending on corporate speech
categorized according to the expected harm to corporate shareholders. 241
Figure 2 suggests a possible graphical representation of a posited
categorical relationship between corporate speech and the expected harm to
shareholders.
Figure 2. Continuum of Expected Harm to Shareholders
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Although this continuum of expected shareholder harm may be correct in
a general sense, this Article contends that sufficient gray exists between
these posited categories of corporate speech to render this continuum
ultimately unhelpful as a justification for assessing the expected harm to
shareholders separately, depending upon the type of expressive expenditure
on corporate social responsibility.
Consider, for example, the distinction between charitable contributions
and political contributions. 242 According to a recent empirical study, “6.3
percent of corporate charitable giving may be politically motivated, an
amount 2.5 times larger than annual PAC contributions and 35 percent of
241. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 478 (suggesting that expressive expenditures
“on lobbying and charitable contributions” can be treated differently than express advocacy
or political contributions, because these “expenditures do not implicate the selection of
public officials, an area in which the interests of unwilling . . . corporate shareholders [in not
being] forced to subsidize that speech are at their zenith”) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
242. Many have made a similar argument with respect to the distinction between issue
advocacy and express advocacy. See, e.g., Kathleen Hall Jamison, Introduction to
ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR., UNIV. OF PA., ISSUE ADVERTISING IN THE 1999-2000 ELECTION
CYCLE 2 (2001) (concluding “[a]fter analyzing hundreds of ads over a seven year period”
that the “distinction between issue advocacy and express advocacy is a fiction”); see also
Eliza Newlin Carney, Air Strikes, NAT’L J., June 15, 1996, at 1313, 1315 (“It is very easy to
write these ads and do these commercials without using those magic words [e.g., “vote for,”
“vote against,” “elect,” “defeat” and “reject”], but they are very clearly campaign ads.”).
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federal lobbying.”243 The study’s authors argue that charitable giving may
be a form of corporate political influence undetected by voters and
subsidized by taxpayers, involving monetary sums that are economically
significant when compared to other channels of political influenceseeking.244 Specifically, the authors find evidence consistent with the
proposition that companies use charitable contributions to influence those
legislators in a position to impact the firm’s profitability. 245 Companies are
statistically significantly more likely to make corporate contributions to
charitable organizations of personal interest to such legislators (defined in
this study as charities in the legislator’s own congressional district or
charities for which the legislator sits on the board). 246
Additionally, the list of charitable contributions in Section IV.B.1
suggests the degree to which a charitable donation can itself be political in
nature even if the contribution cannot be directly linked to an individual
legislator or member of a regulatory agency. Note, for instance, the ACLU
Foundation to which several companies on the list have made charitable
contributions.247 The ACLU Foundation is a 501(c)(3) organization that
engages principally in litigation and communication efforts. 248 Apart from
its Innocence Project, the principal objective of these efforts is not to
advance the specific interests of individual clients, but rather to bring about
broad changes to existing law. 249 Through a strategic combination of impact
litigation, policy reports, and public education, the ACLU Foundation uses
tax-deductible charitable donations to pay its employees to change the law,
often pushing the law in a decidedly left-leaning direction. 250 Although
these efforts certainly help those in need, the organization does not provide
direct assistance; instead, it seeks to help those in need indirectly through
legal change. 251 Arguably, this singular focus on legal or regulatory change
suggests that issue advocacy groups, like the ACLU Foundation, more
closely resemble political action committees that are similarly focused on
243. See Marianne Bertrand et al., Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a
Tool for Political Influence, 110 AM. ECON. REV. 2065, 2065 (2020).
244. Id. at 2100.
245. See id. at 2068.
246. Id.
247. See supra Section IV.B.1.c.
248. ACLU vs. ACLU Foundation, ACLU PA., https://www.aclupa.org/en/about/aclu-vsaclu-foundation (last visited Sept. 29, 2021).
249. See Guardians of Freedom, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/guardians-freedom (last
visited Oct. 2, 2021).
250. See ACLU vs. ACLU Foundation, supra note 248.
251. See Guardians of Freedom, supra note 249.
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legal or regulatory change than standard charitable organizations that are
primarily focused on the equitable redistribution of scarce resources.
Indeed, in many cases, contributions to issue advocacy groups, like the
ACLU Foundation, may have a greater impact on a specific social or
political issue than more overtly political forms of issue advocacy, such as
political contributions or lobbying efforts.252
2. Proposed Communications Committee
Rather than seek to empower shareholders with more tools to govern the
corporation for their benefit, this Article advocates for greater board
involvement as a proper check on corporate activism. As Professor
Bainbridge has convincingly argued elsewhere, placing these types of
decisions squarely in the hands of the board is always the appropriate null
hypothesis.253 Specifically, this Article suggests that the SEC should
encourage public companies that trade on stock exchanges in the United
States to have a communications committee as a distinct operating
committee of the company’s board of directors, charged with oversight and
monitoring of all spending on corporate speech.254

252. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE
ACLU xix (2d ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1999) (1990).
253. See STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (2008); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends
of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (“[D]irector primacy asserts
that . . . [n]either shareholders nor managers control corporations—boards of directors do.”);
cf. Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of
the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (1998) (describing
the conglomerations of the early 1990s—an analog of present-day corporate activism—as an
example of weak boards allowing managerial self-interest to prioritize expanding the size
and scope of a company over shareholder value).
254. Closely held corporations and non-profit business are excluded under the
assumption that the expected harm to shareholders does not exceed the expected costs of
compliance. Further, like the other committees required by the national securities exchanges
(e.g., audit, compensation, nominating), the communications committee should be composed
of independent directors, meaning that a director neither has a pecuniary relationship with
the company or any of its subsidiaries nor is an affiliated person of the company or any of its
subsidiaries. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b) (2021) (audit committee); N.Y.S.E.
Guide (CCH) § 303A.06–.07 (audit committee). Most importantly, each communications
committee member must not participate in, or otherwise be involved with in any way,
business decisions relating to expressive expenditures on corporate social responsibility: the
independence of committee members with respect to this decision-making process is critical.
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a) Structure of Communications Committee
To better understand how this corporate governance proposal might
operate in practice, consider as an illustrative example the Lockheed Martin
Corporation, a company deeply committed to corporate social
responsibility. All corporate social responsibility programs at Lockheed
Martin fall under the purview of the Senior Vice President of Ethics and
Enterprise Assurance, who reports directly to the Chairman, President, and
CEO.255 The Senior Vice President of Ethics and Enterprise Assurance
chairs the company’s Sustainability Work Group. 256 Importantly, this
working group comprises the Vice President of Government Affairs and the
Director of Social Impact.257 The company develops a five-year
Sustainability Management Plan to set goals in specific priority areas that
include ethical conduct, environmental stewardship, corporate culture,
workforce diversity, and employee health and safety.258 The plan is, in
effect, an inward-facing document focused on how the firm’s business
practices can be improved to best serve important stakeholders, including
employees, customers, and the environment. Attention is inwardly focused
on the company itself and how its business practices impact stakeholders
according to several different priority factors such as product safety,
workforce diversity, and carbon management. 259
The corporate governance proposal set forth here would modify
Lockheed Martin’s exemplary approach to corporate social responsibility
by having the company draw a sharper distinction between expressive and
inexpressive expenditures on corporate social responsibility. Specifically,
the company can establish a separate working group dedicated entirely to
the oversight of corporate speech. The Vice President of Government
Affairs, who is responsible for managing and coordinating the company’s
political and public policy activities, and the Director of Social Impact, who
is responsible for developing meaningful stakeholder engagements and
overseeing charitable contributions, can be moved from the existing
Sustainability Working Group to this new proposed working group. In
addition, this group can also include, as key members, the Senior Vice
President of Communications, the Vice President of Corporate
255. LOCKHEED MARTIN, 2020 SUSTAINABILITY REPORT : PROPELLED BY PRINCIPLE 8
(2020), https://sustainability.lockheedmartin.com/sustainability/content/Lockheed_Martin_
2020_Sustainability_Report.pdf.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See id.
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Communications, and the Vice President of Branding and Marketing—none
of whom appear to be a core part of the Sustainability Working Group. 260
The chair of this new working group can report directly to a board
committee comprised entirely of independent directors, which may be the
existing Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee or, preferably,
a newly created Communications Committee as this Article has proposed.
As this example illustrates, the advantage of drawing a sharper
distinction between expressive and inexpressive expenditures on corporate
social responsibility is that certain officers of the company who may not
actively participate in the development of the firm’s corporate social
responsibility initiatives, especially those in the communications and
marketing departments, are now an integral part of a formal process
intended to ensure that spending on corporate speech is undertaken solely
based upon the best interests of the firm’s stockholders, and not upon the
personal agendas of individual officers or other stakeholders of the firm.
Moreover, isolating expressive expenditures on corporate social
responsibility in this fashion allows the company to squarely focus on
corporate behavior with a high risk of shareholder harm. A separate and
distinct assessment reduces the risk that a consideration of the expected
impact of corporate speech on corporate profits becomes lost in a complex
and wider-ranging analysis of how the company’s internal business
practices can best serve the interests of corporate stakeholders beyond the
firm’s stockholders.
b) Responsibilities of Communications Committee
The primary responsibility of this proposed communications committee
is to ensure that spending on corporate speech promotes the best interests of
the firm’s shareholders, and not the interests of other corporate
stakeholders, including management. For this proposal to have teeth, the
board must be required to preapprove certain expenditures. Although a
board can certainly review expenditures on corporate social responsibility
after-the-fact and convey disagreement with certain expenditures to provide
future guidance to management, this proposed committee serves as a much
more effective disciplining mechanism if management must seek approval
for specific spending on corporate speech in advance.
Although this proposal may open the board up to charges of
impermissibly micromanaging the company’s officers who properly run the
daily operations of a corporation, the board can take steps to minimize this
260. See id.
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possibility. In the case of charitable donations, for example, preapproval
can be sought only for donations exceeding a certain threshold amount.
Preapproval by the board is particularly important in connection with public
statements by management on social or political issues unrelated to the
company’s business. The communications committee should help
management understand why a discussion with the committee is expected
before either management, or the corporation itself, takes a position on
certain social or political issues. As Harvey Golub, former chair and CEO
of American Express, persuasively argues in a Wall Street Journal opinion
piece, “[CEOs] always speak for and represent the companies they head. As
CEOs they have the right, and, perhaps the obligation, to speak out on
matters affecting their organizations, but unless they have asked their
boards for approval before speaking, they don’t have that right on unrelated
matters.”261
In assessing whether spending on corporate speech benefits the
company’s shareholders, management and the communications committee
can first informally meet to weigh the arguments for and against making the
expenditure. If management continues to insist on the expenditure after this
initial meeting, then the committee can engage in a traditional corporate
social responsibility analysis to reach a rational business judgment about
whether taking a particular ideological position is, in fact, for the long-term
benefit of shareholders.262 Following this analysis, if the expenditure is
approved by the communications committee, then the committee would be
required to formally justify its approval, carefully explaining, in writing and
with specificity, how the expenditure directly promotes the best interests of
the firm’s shareholders. In the case of a corporate contribution to an issue
advocacy group, for instance, the committee must explain how the specific
policy outcome advanced by the issue advocacy group is likely to promote
the best interests of the firm’s shareholders. If the company, for example,
has spent money in support of a public policy initiative to “raise taxes on
the top 1 percent of Americans,” then the committee must be able to explain
how this desired change to the prevailing tax structure can be expected to

261. Harvey Golub, Opinion, Politics Is Risky Business for CEOs, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12,
2021, 6:19 PM ET) (emphasis added), https://www.wsj.com/articles/politics-is-riskybusiness-for-ceos-11618265960.
262. See generally Sapna Maheshwari, The Delicate Dance of a Progressive C.E.O. in
the Trump Era, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/business/
media/sonic-drive-in-clifford-hudson.html (discussing the caution required by Sonic’s
leadership in taking particular ideological positions on public policy issues).
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directly benefit the company’s stockholders, rather than benefit society in
some more abstract sense.263
In addition, the communications committee can specifically check for
potential misdirection by management (e.g., green-washing, wokewashing).264 In the short run, corporate managers have an incentive to
misrepresent the firm’s true social impact, communicating to its
stakeholders, especially its customers and investors, a message of corporate
social responsibility that does not accurately portray the company’s
business practices.265 At some point, however, these stakeholders may come
to realize in the long run the extent to which the company’s expressive
expenditures on corporate social responsibility do not correspond with the
firm’s actual business practices. To avoid the negative financial outcomes
that are likely to result when the firm’s stakeholders become aware of such
a disconnect, the board can ask management whether the proposed
expenditure on corporate advocacy accurately depicts, without any
additional action by the firm, existing business operations, or whether the
proposed expenditure potentially exposes the company to the credible
charge that its outward-facing communications are false or misleading and
misrepresent the company’s true internal business practices.
Importantly, not only does this proposed communications committee
help minimize agency costs between a firm’s shareholders and its corporate
managers, but it also serves to reduce corporate participation in wasteful
ideological conflict.266 As discussed, broad corporate speech rights place
public business corporations under tremendous pressure to take a public
stance on social or political issues unrelated to the company’s business. 267
The firm can choose to stay silent, to concede the fight, and to allow hostile
forces to mischaracterize its ideological viewpoints. Or the firm can expend
costly corporate resources to participate in an ideological conflict that
accomplishes very little. In either case, the company loses. To avoid this
263. See Leahy, supra note 94, at 1211. If a firm, for example, sells mass-market knockoff designer clothing, then the committee might argue that reducing income inequality is
likely to produce higher disposable incomes among its customers, leading to increased sales
and corporate profits. See id.
264. See, e.g., Francesca Sobande, Woke-Washing: ‘Intersectional’ Femvertising and
Branding ‘Woke’ Bravery, 54 EUR. J. MKTG. 2723, 2738–39 (2020) (exploring how public
business corporations can fail to live up to the social or political values professed in
advertising campaigns or public statements). See generally VIVEK RAMASWAMY, WOKE,
INC.: INSIDE CORPORATE AMERICA’S SOCIAL JUSTICE SCAM (2021).
265. See Vredenburg et al., supra note 215.
266. See id.
267. See id.
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no-win situation, a public business corporation must have some type of
commitment mechanism that restricts its freedom to engage in corporate
speech; a corporation’s hands must be tied in some way. 268 Here, the board
of directors serves as this commitment mechanism: in response to external
pressure to comment publicly on a social or political issue unrelated to the
company’s business, a firm can point to its board of directors as the
exclusive source of its corporate silence, stating that the board has expressly
concluded that corporate speech on this particular social or political issue is
not in the best interests of the firm’s shareholders and that the company
must stay silent as a result.269
3. Mandated Disclosure
Finally, one of the main contributions of the present Article is to observe
that corporate social responsibility often requires a public business
corporation to engage in some form of protected speech to promote social
or political issues unrelated to company’s business practices. As discussed,
conceiving of a public corporation as a person capable of acting “good” or
being somehow socially moral fails to appreciate that the shareholders of a
public business corporation cannot plausibly be thought to have joined
together for shared associational reasons unrelated to profit and pitches a
public corporation into ideological conflicts better resolved through more
conventional democratic processes.270 When a public business corporation
is asked to take a public stance on issues unrelated to the company’s
business, a task for which this legal construct is sorely ill-suited, the
outcomes can be painfully absurd. Why is an ice-cream company, for
instance, taking a public position on complex public policy issues related to
policing practices and crime control, without any meaningful
elaboration?271 Why is a fast-food hamburger chain publicly committing to
increasing visibility around issues of mental health and well-being?272 Why
is a manufacturer of orange juice feigning a mental health crisis, tweeting

268. See generally Isabelle Brocas et al., Commitment Devices Under Self-Control
Problems: An Overview, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS. VOL. 2: REASONS
AND CHOICES 49 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2004).
269. As this response becomes the social norm, the incentive to make such requests of a
public business corporation in the first instance should diminish correspondingly.
270. See Gordon, supra note 104, at 1521–22.
271. See Ben & Jerry’s, supra note 186.
272. See Kaitlyn Tiffany, Burger King Is the Latest Brand to Use Depression as a
Marketing Tool, VOX (May 2, 2019, 2:40 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/
2019/5/2/18527110/burger-king-unhappy-meals-steakumms-sad-brand-twitter.
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morosely, without any context provided, that “I can’t do this anymore”? 273
Rather than engage in corporate speech to promote social or political issues
unrelated to the company’s business, a public business corporation can
better promote corporate social responsibility by turning inward and
focusing exclusively on inexpressive expenditures on internal business
practices; corporate social responsibility is better implemented through
concrete corporate action, through tangible changes to existing business
practices, and not through corporate speech. A truly socially responsible
corporation, rejecting shareholder primacy as its operating model of
corporate governance, chooses to structure its business operations such that
corporate profits are sacrificed to make other corporate stakeholders better
off. 274
A complete reimagining of the modern public corporation, with some
form of stakeholder primacy replacing shareholder primacy as the operating
model of corporate governance, raises a number of perhaps insurmountable
difficulties. A less ambitious view of corporate social responsibility,
however, sees this form of private business self-regulation not as a
fundamentally new organizing model of corporate governance, but as a
promising customer or investor phenomenon in which a public business
corporation maximizes profits subject to certain binding ethical or moral
constraints imposed upon it by socially conscious corporate stakeholders.
Rather than push companies to advocate in support of social or political
issues unrelated to their business, corporate stakeholders, if able to act
collectively, can compel public companies to operate in a manner that
provides measurable concrete benefits to society beyond corporate
profits.275 Through their individual investment or consumption decisions,
corporate stakeholders can force public business corporations to employ a
more diverse workforce, to manufacture their products in more
environmentally sustainable ways, or to pay equitable wages that do not
reflect gender or racial bias. Surely this type of inward-looking corporate
action is the desired outcome of any meaningful corporate social
273. See SUNNYD (@sunnydelight), TWITTER (Feb. 3, 2019, 8:24 PM), https://twitter.
com/sunnydelight/status/1092247574336163840.
274. See generally Elhauge, supra note 16, at 744–45. In the case of our hypothetical
toothpaste manufacturer, the company acts in a truly socially responsible manner not
through the exercise of its corporate speech rights, but in adopting the low-pollution
production technology, notwithstanding decreased corporate profits, to reduce the negative
externalities imposed upon the local community in the form of socially harmful water
pollution.
275. See, e.g., Leslie King & Elisabeth Gish, Marketizing Social Change: Social
Shareholder Activism and Responsible Investing, 58 SOCIO. PERSPS. 711, 716–17 (2015).
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responsibility initiative. Socially conscious corporate stakeholders cannot
wish a company merely to engage in some elaborate public relations
charade in which the firm strives to convince the general public that it is a
“good” company deeply concerned about its broader social impact, while at
the same time conducting its business in a manner entirely inconsistent with
its corporate brand marketing. Corporate action, and not corporate speech,
must be the end goal.
For stakeholder preferences to act as a binding constraint in this manner,
however, stakeholders, in assessing whether a public company has satisfied
specific ESG criteria, must be reasonably informed as to the firm’s internal
business practices related to such ESG criteria.276 In theory, a company can
be relied upon to voluntarily disclose this privately held information to the
relevant stakeholders.277 More likely, some type of mandatory disclosure
regime no different than for information materially related to a public
company’s financial condition or operating results is required to make
ESG-related information publicly available. 278 Accordingly, corporate
social responsibility from the perspective of a public business corporation
reduces to a matter of corporate accounting and reporting likely falling
under the purview of the firm’s audit committee. Given mandated
disclosure of information related to internal ESG-related business practices,
the question facing a public business corporation thus becomes to what
extent must the business operate to satisfy the socially conscious
276. In the case of our hypothetical toothpaste manufacturer, consumers and investors
must know whether the firm has adopted the low-cost technology or the high-cost
technology. If the firm has chosen the low-cost technology, then the firm has an incentive to
keep quiet—or more insidiously, to actively create a false or misleading public impression
that the firm has chosen the high-cost technology.
277. See, e.g., Hank Boerner, Public Companies Respond to Investor Expectations,
Expanding Voluntary Disclosure on ESG Issues, 19 CORP. FIN. REV. 32 (2014). See
generally Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private
Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1981).
278. See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, Disclosure Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure &
ESG Reporting Reform from the Regulation S-K Concept Release, 65 VILL. L. REV. 67, 75–
83 (2020); Ruth Jebe, The Convergence of Financial and ESG Materiality: Taking
Sustainability Mainstream, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 645, 696–702 (2019); see also Allison Herren
Lee, Acting Chair, SEC, Speech to the Center for American Progress: A Climate for
Change: Meeting Investor Demand for Climate and ESG Information at the SEC (Mar. 15,
2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-climate-change (announcing that the SEC is
taking steps to develop a mandatory reporting ESG disclosure framework). But see generally
OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2016) (arguing that mandatory disclosure rarely
works).
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preferences of a broad set of corporate stakeholders beyond its
stockholders. This is a question necessarily motivated by profit
maximization and not ethical or moral concerns and which—unlike the
question of whether now is the right time for a corporate manager to
publicly communicate some personal stance on a social or political issue
unrelated to the company’s business—is the right type of question that a
public corporation should ask in seeking to conduct its business in a more
truly socially responsible manner.
V. Conclusion
This Article has advanced the claim that expenditures by a public
business corporation on the promotion of social or political issues unrelated
to the company’s business generally do not maximize corporate profits and
has termed such spending corporate activism. Corporate activism was
modeled as the product of both agency costs and ideological conflict that
derive from the U.S. Supreme Court’s expansion of corporate speech rights
under the First Amendment. To protect shareholders against corporate
activism, the Court has relied upon various disciplining mechanisms that
were deemed largely not up to the task. This Article has offered a different
solution, placing the responsibility squarely upon the board of directors of
public business corporations to prevent expressive expenditures on
corporate social responsibility that do not advance the best interests of the
firm’s shareholders. If the board is required to formally assess all spending
on corporate speech in a comprehensive manner and to justify its approval
of any such expenditure, in writing, specifically explaining how the firm’s
shareholders directly stand to benefit, the claim is that this more exacting
scrutiny by the firm’s board of directors will reduce the frequency with
which public business corporations engage in corporate activism to the
detriment of its stockholders.
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